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ABSTRACT 
Alasdair Macintyre asserts in After Virtue that 
contemporary moral discourse is only arbitrary assertion 
of the will. Appeals to reasoned arguments have been 
replaced by expressions of preference, attitude and 
feeling-- in short, by "emotivism." Macintyre locates 
this moral breakdown in the Enlightenment philosophers' 
failed attempt to replace Aristotelian teleology with a 
rational justification for morality. 
Macintyre's analysis fails because he does not show 
whose interests are served through the assertion of 
arbitrary 
supposed 
will or whose interests were served when 
"objective" standard of the Middle 
the 
Ages 
prevailed. 
played by 
He does not acknowledge the preeminent role 
the material relations of production and 
exchange in the construction of a society's 
standards. 
moral 
A class analysis suggests that emotivism originated 
in the overthrow of feudal society by the newly developing 
industrial class of free traders. The concept of the 
"free individual" facilitated the organization of 
production on the basis of wage-labour. The ensuing class 
struggle led to the dominance of emotivism in contemporary 
moral discourse. 
Macintyre's revised version of the Aristotelian 
iv 
concept of the telos cannot establish a rational basis for 
morality. Without structural changes designed to 
eliminate class divisions, emotivism cannot be supplanted. 
It can only be suppressed by means of instruments such as 
Macintyre's version of the telos. It is because Macintyre 
fails to analyze emotivism as the product of class 
struggle that he advises us to prepare for "the new dark 
ages which are already upon us" (Macintyre, After Virtue, 
hereinafter referred to as AV, p. 263). 
v 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Macintyre claims that contemporary moral philosophy, 
constituted mainly by liberal individualism and Marxism, 
has suffered a major catastrophe. The various concepts and 
philosophies we draw upon in everyday moral discourse 
"were originally at home in larger totalities of theory 
and practice" (AV, p. 10). The social contexts of these 
totalities gave their relevant concepts and philosophies a 
specific role and function. Ignorance of this will likely 
result in ahistorical conclusions with questionable 
application for present-day problems. Macintyre directs 
this accusation at contemporary philosophers, many who use 
all past concepts and philosophies within the context of a 
single debate. But this leads to an unintelligible 
abstraction from their original social and cultural 
milieus. The complexity of this history is underestimated 
as is the ancestry of such arguments. Instead of looking 
for that history only in philosophers' writings, we should 
be seeking "those intricate bodies of theory and practice 
which constitute human cultures" (AV, p. 10). Unable to 
grasp the contextual framework in which philosophical 
theories and practices arose, we are consequently left 
with mere "fragments of a conceptual scheme, parts which 
now lack those contexts from which their significance 
derived" (AV, p. 2). The language of morality, Macintyre 
concludes, is thus in a grave state of disorder; "we have 
-- very largely , 
comprehension, both 
morality " (AV , p. 2) . 
if not entirely -- lost 
theoretical and practical, 
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our 
or 
Macintyre insists that what passes for moral 
discourse in the modern world is sheer arbitrary assertion 
without moral criteria. Characteristically, this type of 
discourse is devoid of conceptual commensurability in 
moral arguments -~ there is no common measure by which to 
evaluate them. In this respect, in order to subject moral 
arguments to a process of rational discrimination and 
deliberation requires that all participants possess a 
shared understanding with regard to the usage of moral 
concepts and their respective meanings in light of that 
usage. Usage and meaning of moral concepts would 
therefore be in agreement. This is not the case, however, 
in contemporary argument. As a result, moral superiority 
among rival premises is left to the discretion of 
arbitrary variables such as personality, verbal eloquence, 
and charisma. What is certain is that the stronger and 
psychologically 
these arguments 
criteria which 
more adroit will prevails. Nonetheless, 
do purport to appeal to impersonal 
are independent of the preferences and 
attitudes of the speaker and listener. Thus, even if the 
practice of moral argument is a masquerade for the 
stronger will, there still remains in this culture the 
aspiration to be rational. What these moral arguments 
lack, therefore, is a uniform standard recognized by all 
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as possessing singular authority upon which their relative 
claims of moral fact and truth can be weighed and 
deliberated on a rational basis. In lieu of such a 
standard, morality in the modern world is simply emotivism 
-- the doctrine 
specifically all 
that "all evaluative judgments and 
moral judgments are nothing 
more 
but 
expressions of preference, expressions of attitude or 
feeling, insofar as they are moral or evaluative in 
character" (AV, pp. 11-12). Emotivism asserts that moral 
argument is simply a mask for personal preference. 
Moreover, moral argument has always consisted solely of 
personal preferences, for no objective and impersonal 
moral standards can be justified. 
Macintyre objects to the emotivist theory of meaning 
for three reasons. First, if emotivism is to elucidate 
the meaning of a certain class of sentences by referring 
to their function when uttered, then identifica ion of the 
types of feelings or attitudes in question must be 
possible. 
do this. 
Macintyre claims that emotivists are unable to 
All attempts to classify the relevant types of 
and attitudes wind up in an empty circularity. 
judgments express feelings or attitudes,' it is 
'What kind of feelings or attitudes?' we ask. 
feelings 
11 
'Moral 
said. 
'Feelings or attitudes of approval,' is the reply. 'What 
kind of approval?' we ask." This is either followed by 
silence or the circular response given is that of 11moral 
approval" (AV, pp. 12-13). The reliance on a moral 
9 
standard thus undercuts the emotivist argument. 
Second, emotivism fails because it characterizes as 
equivalent expressions of personal preference and 
evaluative expressions. The former are seen by Macintyre 
as consisting of arbitrary decisions while evaluative 
expressions involve matters of fact. They "derive their 
distinctive function in our [my emphasis] language in key 
part from the contrast and difference between them" (AV, 
p. 13). Thus statements which command the listener to do 
something without any reason are contextual in that the 
parameters necessary for a correct decision depend only on 
the relationships which are apparent within that context. 
For example, a private will follow a general's orders 
simply out of respect for the general's authority. On the 
other hand, statements which command the listener to do 
something for a reason can be evaluated on the basis of 
impersonal criteria which are independent of the 
relationship between speaker and hearer. Utterances of 
personal preference are therefore dependent upon who 
utters them in what particular context. Evaluative 
expressions, on the contrary, are not dependent on the 
speaker or the context of utterance for their "reason-
giving force" (AV, p. 13). 
Third, Macintyre claims that emotivism is more 
appropriate as a theory of the usage of sentences than as 
a theory about the meaning of such sentences. In this 
sense, emotivist theory should examine the purpose or 
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function of moral utterances and not claim that judgments 
such as "'This is right' or 'This is good'" mean the same 
as "'I approve of this; do so as well' or 'Hurrah for 
this! ' or any of the other attempts at equivalence 
suggested by emotivist theorists" (AV, p. 13). As a 
theory of usage, therefore, expressions of feeling or 
attitude should be understood not as a function of their 
meaning but rather of their use on particular occasions. 
Nevertheless, emotivists may claim that in making 
judgmental assertions, an agent still expresses his 
feelings or attitudes and thus attempts to influence 
others. If so, then the meaning and use of moral 
expressions have therefore become "radically discrepant 
with each other" (AV, p. 14). Thus, "to a large degree 
people now think, talk and act as if emotivism were true" 
(AV, p. 22). Macintyre cannot accept such a conclusion. 
In response to the emotivists' assertion that all attempts 
to provide a rational justification for an objective 
morality have failed, Macintyre claims that genuine, 
objective and impersonal moral standards can be justified. 
In this thesis, I will first summarize Macintyre's 
argument. I shall then demonstra e that Wlthout a class 
analysis, Macintyre is unable to see that the origin of 
emotivism lies in contradictions arising from the 
development of the mat rial forces and relations of 
production and exchange. Because his argument is not 
historical, he incorrectly understands emotivisrn as a 
11 
problem of metaphysics rather than as a product of social 
contradictions. I wil l thus argue that the rejection of 
Aristotelianism, the basis of the "Enlightenment Project , " 
and the popular recognition of emotivism are the product 
of the evolutionary development of class struggles rather 
than the result of unsolved problems in the realm of 
ideas. A materialist perspective will show that a 
coherent analysis of social reality first requires insight 
into the overall structure of production in a society. 
This will include an analysis of the technological 
development of the productive forces, the operational mode 
and organizational structure of production, and the 
relationship of labourers to the means of production and 
the product of their work. Specific attention must be 
focused on whether a distinction is made ither legally or 
through custom between those who own and control the means 
of production and those who perform the direct labour. In 
light of such distinctions, it is then necessary to 
determine whether the economic conditions which support 
the existence of these groups are such that a hostile 
opposition exists. Only then can we analyze the class 
basis upon which the legal, cultural, and ideological 
forms of reality in a society are constructed. Withou 
such a perspective, all attempts to establish an objective 
framework for rational discourse will fail. Through the 
method of class analysis, however, the conclusion is 
reached that an appeal to objective criteria can be 
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attained only with the elimination of class divisions. I 
conclude therefore that Macintyre's solution to emotivism 
fails, because he does not address the class basis of his 
proposed teleological society. His resurrection of the 
Aristotelian telos is thus a tool for suppression, not 
liberation. 
II. MACINTYRE'S ARGUMENT 
But though reason is undoubtedly the source of 
the general rules of morality, and of all the 
moral judgments which we form by means of them, 
it is altogether absurd and unintelligible to 
suppose that the first perceptions of right and 
wrong can be derived from reason, even in those 
particular cases upon the experience of which the 
general rules are formed. These first 
perceptions, as well as all other experiments 
upon which any general rules are formed, cannot 
be the object of reason, but of immediate sense 
and feeling (Smith, The Theory of Moral 
Sentiments, p. 470). 
13 
Emotivism "entails the obliteration of any g,enuine 
distinction between manipulative and non-manipulative 
social relations" (AV, p. 23). It supplants standards of 
normative rationality with sociological and psychological 
generalizations. Macintyre therefore defends not only a 
philosophical analysis of our present predicament but also 
a sociological hypothesis about the major characters of 
our contemporary cultural setting. 
Major characters embody the "moral and metaphysical 
ideas and theories" of their culture. "Characters are the 
masks worn by moral philosophies" (AV, p. 2:8). The moral 
constraints of their roles are more defined relative to 
other social roles, because they are representatives of a 
culture. Thus, other people use characters as standards 
by which to understand and evaluate themselves. 
Macintyre contrasts the intentions of a nondescript 
individual who acts in the context of a particular history 
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of actions, beliefs, experiences and interactions with 
that of a character such as a Catholic priest. The priest 
officiates at Mass and performs other rites and rituals 
which presuppose the beliefs of Catholic Christianity, but 
personally he may lack faith. Thus, while the nondescript 
individual may act in accord with the beliefs in his mind 
or heart, the requirements of the character (the priest) 
are imposed from outside. 
Public officials and other office holders thus do not 
necessarily constitute characters. Instead, the character 
is a type which stands out in a given historical epoch. 
The distinction of a character from a nondescript 
individual, therefore, is the extent to which he or she is 
"an object of regard by the members of the culture 
generally or by some significant segment of them" (AV, p. 
29). Thus, to the degree that characters legitimate a 
mode of social existence, the requirements of the role and 
the personality of the individual fulfilling that role 
must fuse. Hence, the character furnishes a cultural and 
moral legitimacy for a mode of social existence. 
Three main characters are commonplace in the sociology 
out of which ernotivism springs. First is the rich 
aesthete whose cynicism will not allow his overindulgence 
in pleasure to satiate him. Second is the therapist who is 
the most liable to be deceived by the claims of his 
therapeutic theories which are part of the ernotivist moral 
fiction .. Third is the manager or bureaucratic expert 
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whose fictive claim to control certain aspects of social 
reality is merely a mask for the manipulation of human 
beings. Each character believes his or her respective 
claims are rational. But according to Macintyre, each 
personifies the emotivist thesis which sees no distinction 
between manipulative and non-manipulative social 
relationships. Moreover, each provides the modern 
emotivist culture with its moral definitions. 
The aesthete seeks personal satisfaction. He thinks 
his social context is populated by similar solipsistic 
wills, each seeking personal gratification. But while the 
aesthete's wealth relieves him from the necessity of work, 
it preoccupies him in a restless search for ways to employ 
it. So to fend off the boredom of a life of leisure, he 
contrives plans by which to manipulate the behavior of 
others in a manner responsive to his wishes. 
On the contrary, both the therapist and the manager 
treat ends as given; they are concerned only with 
techniques to do their jobs effectively. In their roles 
they do not and, Macintyre claims, are unable to engage in 
moral debate (AV, p. 30). Thus they restrict themselves 
to the realms in which rational agreement is possible. 
These realms of agreement, from their point of view, are 
the realm of fact, the realm of means, and the realm of 
measurable effectiveness. Hence in their eyes and in the 
eyes of those who see them in a similar manner, they 
remain uncontested figur s whose interpretations are 
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"value-free" and "neutral" based in fact and steeped in 
incontrovertible evidence. However, their claims to 
effectiveness and hence to authority are essentially 
cultural fictions, for they lack any rational criteria of 
judgment. Bureaucratic authority which appeals solely to 
its own effectiveness is mere power. Manipulation, 
therefore, consititutes the predominate mode of social 
relations. And to "a disturbing extent our morality will 
be disclosed as a theatre of illusions" (AV, p. 77). 
As a result, there is no rational basis for our 
morality. There is merely a contest of wills in an 
assertive and counter-assertive irresolvable polemic. In 
this regard, 
indefinitely 
apparently 
Macintyre is not saying that debates go on 
"- although they do - but also that they 
can find no terminus" (AV, 
contemporary moral 
unfounded assertions 
philosophy is 
and consequently 
p. 6) • If our 
characterized by 
by interminable 
argument, then how was moral language and philosophy 
understood in an "ordered" form when "objective" criteria 
existed? 
Macintyre's claims rest on an analysis of societies 
which existed prior to academic history. Earlier 
societies contained heirarchies which bound individuals to 
their social roles and ordered their social practices. 
Such societies embodied the "conception of a whole human 
life as the primary subject of objective and impersonal 
evaluation, of a type of evaluation which provides the 
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content for judgment upon the particular actions or 
projects of a given individual" (AV, p. 34). One's 
identity was determined by one's membership in different 
social groupings. Village, tribal and familial 
affiliation defined one's social role and relationship to 
others. 
outcast. 
possible 
One who lacked such a role was a stranger or an 
Since life was ordered to a given end, it was 
to determine objectively whether or not 
individuals achieved their ends. 
This conception of a whole human life is absent in 
the contemporary assumption that the individual is 
distinct from the roles he or she plays. The modern self 
is thus cut off from boundaries located in roles and 
practices. It lacks a social identity and the view of 
human life as ordered to a given end. Questions asking 
"What is the good for man?" have been discarded because no 
answer is possible. The modern self therefore rejects the 
notion of teleology, the notion that we all are born with 
a designated purpose. Consequently, our lives become 
unintelligible and disjointed. But the self, Macintyre 
asserts, is not entirely distinct from particular social 
roles. It is not the project of virtually open or endless 
possibilities (as per the early Sartre). At the same 
time, however, the self is more than just the roles it 
plays (cf. Goffman) . 
How did the modern emotivist self emerge and what were 
the root causes of the disorder in moral philosophy? How 
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did we lose a moral standard from which to judge and to 
act? The disorder arose, Macintyre states, because our 
predecessor culture did not solve its philosophical 
problems. Specifically, the culture of the Enlightenment 
failed to develop an independent rational justification 
for morality. The subsequent breakdown of this 
Enlightenment project is at the root of our current 
predicament. Macintyre asserts tha the culmination of 
this project was first presented in a book which at once 
was "the outcome and the epitaph of the Enlightenment's 
systematic attempt to discover a rational justification 
for morality" (AV, p. 39). The book was Kierkegaard's 
Enten-Eller (known by its English translation as 
Either/Or). 
With Kierkegaard, the question of principles and 
standards for one's life arise out of a radical choice. 
One of two possible options was imperative for all of us. 
The first option is the ethical way of life consisting of 
attendant distinctions between good and evil. The second 
option is the aesthetic way of life in which the self is 
lost in the immediacy of present experience. "The choice 
between the ethical and the aesthetic is not the choice 
between good and evil," Macintyre explains "i is the 
choice whether or not to choose in t rms of good and evil" 
(AV, p. 40). Principles possess authority independent of 
attitudes, preferences, and feelings in the ethical 
dimension and are thus not arbitrary. How one feels 
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serves as the guide in the aesthetic. Though Kierkegaard 
favored the choice of the ethical, he could give no reason 
for its adoption other than as an arbitrary consequence of 
the imperative of radical choice. 
Macintyre traces Kierkegaard's dilemma to the 
influence of Kant, who saw the basis of the ethical life 
not in the passions but rather in practical reason. For 
Kant, reason 
lays down principles which are universal, 
categorical and internally consistent. Hence a 
rational morality will lay down principles which 
both can and ought to be held by all men, 
independent of circumstances and conditions, and 
which could consistently be obeyed by every 
rational agent on every occasion" (AV, p. 45). 
Kant insisted that all true expressions of morality 
have a categorical imperative which enjoins us. In this 
sense, fundamental concepts or 'categories' must be 
applied to the contents of possible sensory experience in 
order to form objective judgments. Morality, therefore, 
cannot be based on our desires for happiness or pleasure, 
for these desires are not consistent or categorical. 
Moreover, in order to do what God commands, we must have 
an independent moral judgment to know what God commands. 
Thus morality is not rooted in the passions or in the 
divine but rather in the consistent universality of 
practical reason. 
Kant's attempt to base morality on reason alone fails, 
Macintyre asserts. We cannot with good reason consistently 
will that everyone should act in a certain manner. A 
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maxim such as "'Always eat mussels on Mondays in March'" 
is equally as valid as maxims such as "'Always tell the 
truth'" and "'Always keep promises'" (AV, pp. 45-46). And 
even if we restrict Kant's categorical imperative to the 
moral sphere by asserting: "'Always ..• treat humanity. 
as an end, and not as a means'" (AV, p. 46), no good 
reason exist to favor this imperative over one which 
asserts: "'Let everyone except me be treated as a means'" 
(AV, p. 46). This inability to base morality in reason 
led Kierkegaard to conclude that we simply must choose. 
Kant's location of morality in reason, however, arose 
out of an earlier project by Hume who sought to base 
morality in the passions, not reason. For Hume, morality 
was a part of practical philosophy that consists of rules 
and precepts to guide our passions and actions. He 
observed that morals excite our passions and influence our 
affections. Reason, for Hume, 
is the discovery of truth or falshood. Truth 
or falshood consists in an agreement or 
disagreement ither to the real relations of 
ideas, or to real existence and matter of fact. 
Whatever, therefore, is not susceptible of this 
agreement or disagreement, is incapable of being 
true or false, and can never be an object of our 
reason. Now 'tis evident our passions, 
volitions, and actions, are not susceptible of 
any such agreement or disagreement; being 
original facts and realities, compleat in 
themselves, and implying no reference to other 
passions, volitions, and actions. 'Tis 
impossible, therefore they can be pronounced 
either true or false, and be either contrary or 
conformable to reason (Hume's Ethical Writings, 
pp. 185-86). 
Reason alone, Hume wrote, can never prevent or 
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produce action, it can only direct our judgment toward or 
away from the causes and effects of action. By detecting 
the relation between cause and effect, our actions are 
subsequently altered, by either an aversion or propensity 
towards an object. Reason is thus subsequent to the 
impulse and impulse is only directed by the former. And 
only a contrary impulse can prevent volition. Therefore, 
because "reason can never immediately prevent or produce 
any action by contradicting or approving of it, it cannot 
be the source of moral good and evil, which are found to 
have that influence" (Hume's Ethical Writings, p. 186). 
Nonetheless, Hume recognized that general rules are 
invoked in moral judgment. Such rules help attain those 
ends which the passions set before us. Hume's claims, 
however, 
passions 
Revolution 
are historically restricted. They rest on the 
particular to a complacent heir of the Glorious 
of 1688. Hume, therefore, covertly uses a 
standard for moral principles. 
Reliance on the passions suffers accordingly when 
Hume and his contemporary Adam Smith invoke sympathy 
rather than a moral standard as a bridge to remedy the 
defects of action arising out of interest and utility. 
Interest and utility could lead one to break promises when 
the promises no longer serve the agent's interests. Why 
therefore keep promises that no longer serve our interests 
if breaking them would result in no other ill 
consequences? One answer is that of sympathy or 'fellow 
22 
feeling'. "But the gap of course is logically 
unbridgable," asserts Macintyre, "and 'sympathy' as used 
by Hume and Smith is the name of a philosophical fiction 
1 
(AV, p. 4 9) • 
Macintyre concludes that these philosophers fail to 
vindicate the Enlightenment project. 
Just as Hume seeks to found morality on the 
passions because his arguments have excluded the 
possibility of founding it on reason, so Kant 
founds it on reason because his arguments have 
excluded the possibility of founding it on the 
passions, and Kierkegaard on criterionless 
fundamental choice because of what he takes to be 
the compelling nature of the considerations which 
exclude both reason and the passions (A~, p. 49). 
As a result, this culture's failure to provide the 
foundation for moral discourse and action that religion 
could no longer furnish led to philosophy's decline from 
its central cultural role o a arginal academic 
discipline. 
These philosophers were unable to provide a rational 
vindication of morality because they all shared the same 
historical and social background. This background, 
Macintyre asserts, possessed an internal incoherence in 
its moral beliefs, an incoherence which ensured the 
failure of any common project. All "agree to a surprising 
degree on the content and character of the precepts which 
constitute genuine morality" (AV, p. 51) • For 
Kierkegaard, the radical choice was not which ethics to 
live by to him this was a given but rather whether 
or not to live by the ethical way of life. Similarly, 
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once morality was based upon reason, Kant felt one's moral 
duty was clear. And for Hume, though moral judgment arose 
out of the passions, certain general rules must be invoked 
to help us attain the ends the passions set before us. 
But, as Macintyre indicated earlier, the passions 
underlying Hume's rules were particular to a complacent 
heir of the Glorious Revolution. All these philosophers, 
therefore, possessed a congruence in their precepts of 
morality which flowed from a shared Christian perspective 
or weltanschauung (AV, p. 51). 
These philosophers further agreed that a rational 
justification of morality would characterize some feature 
or features of human nature. Rules of morality would then 
"be explained and justified as being those rules which a 
being possessing just such a human nature could be 
expected to accept" (AV, p. 52). Their separate projects 
of constructing arguments which would move from premises 
about human nature to conclusions about the authority of 
moral rules and precepts failed, however, because they 
lacked any conception of a true end for man. 
The shared intellectual background of these 
philosophers was characterized by the secular rejection of 
both Protestant and Catholic theology and the scientific 
and philosophical rejection of Aristotelianism. The 
latter had as its foundation a moral schema with the 
purpose 
nature. 
of correcting and 
This morality as 
improving 
rooted 
untutored human 
in Aristotle's 
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teleological scheme which sought to transform roan-as-he-
happens-to-be into roan-as-he-could-be-if-he-realized-his-
essential-nature. Required of this perspective was the 
view of man as a rational being, some conception of the 
human telos or roan-as-he-could-be-if-he-realized-his-
telos, and the moral precepts enabling this 
transformation. Likewise, these moral precepts were found 
in a rational ethics which presupposed an account of 
potentiality and action, an account of the essence of man 
as a rational animal, and an account of the human telos. 
Such an account had been present in the theistic beliefs 
of Christianity, Judaism, and Islam. As such, the 
teleological injunctions expressed divine law. The 
theological injunctions of sin replaced the Aristotelian 
concept of error. Negating salva ion in this world, man's 
true end was directed toward another. Yet, 
the threefold structure of untutored human-
nature-as-it-happens-to-be, human-nature-as-it-
could-be-if-it-realized-its-telos and the 
precepts of rational ethics as the means for the 
transition from one to the other remains central 
to the theistic understanding of evaluative 
thought and judgment (AV, p. 53). 
When this structure was abandoned, however, essential 
natures and teleological features available for study in 
the physical universe could no longer be recognized 
through ra ional deliberation. The rejection of any 
teleological view or the perspective of roan-as-he-could-
be-if-he-realized-his-telos thus rendered the 
Enlightenment project disabled from the start. As such, 
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the Enlightenment philosophers were left to work with only 
the remaining two elements of the teleological structure 
consisting of "a set of injunctions deprived of their 
teleological context" and "a certain view of untutored-
human-nature-as-it-is" (AV, p. 55) • These moral 
injunctions were originally based in a scheme to correct, 
improve and educate human nature. Now that this view no 
longer seemed valid, neither did the moral injunctions. 
The Aristotelian tradition rests on the central idea 
that man has an essential nature guiding his development. 
Man then has a purpose which is clear and indisputable in 
this tradition; moral and evaluative statements could 
determine what is good and what is bad, what is true and 
what is false. Everything and everyone had a specific 
purpose or function. When this notion is abandoned, "it 
begins to appear implausible to treat moral judgments as 
factual statements" (AV, p. 59}. 
As "bizarre and improbable" (AV, p. 3) as the 
dissolution of a previous framework may appear, Macintyre 
insists that only a very few can recognize the catastrophe 
at hand. This is so because the catatastrophe has not 
been recognized as a catastrophe. But if his thesis is 
correct, then "we are all already in a state so disas rous 
that there are no large remedies for it" (AV, p. 5). 
III. DISAGREEMENT ON THE NATURE OF MORAL DISAGREEMENT 
But the old idealist conception of history, which 
was not yet dislodged, knew nothing of class 
struggles based upon economic interests, knew 
nothing of economic interests; production and all 
economic relations appeared in it only as 
incidental, subordinate elements in the "history 
of civilisation" (Engels, Socialism: Utopian and 
Scientific, pp. 44-45). 
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Macintyre believes that the inability of modern man 
to agree on a concept of the nature of man that can serve 
as a standard for behavior is rooted in the demise of the 
Enlightenment rejection of the Aristotelian idea of the 
telos. And subsequent to this demise moral utterance has 
been put to uses at the service of arbitrary will. 
Macintyre, however, refuses to address the question of 
whose arbitrary will has been served. He claims this "is 
not my task" (AV, p. 110). However, it is his task to 
address this question if he wishes to explain why there is 
no common standard for moral discourse in modern society. 
Macintyre believes that only ideas determine 
historical development. He ignores the real origin of 
ideas, moral or otherwise, rooted in the social relations 
that arise out of the mode of production and exchange of a 
society. Without analyzing these structures his 
subsequent explanation of the rejection of Aristotelian 
teleology falters as does his understanding of modern 
emotivism. His reactionary advice to prepare for the new 
dark ages, as a consequence, will not provide a solution 
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to the problem of emotivism. 
To search for a common standard by which to judge and 
to act, social relations must first be structured upon a 
common program. Such a program would require the mutual 
participation of all in the socially directed processes of 
production. Arbitrary discrimination would be supplanted 
by collective appraisal of abilities and needs. The 
social product would be distributed on the basis of social 
rather than private considerations. And advancement of 
workers' interests would constitute the common grounds 
upon which rational deliberation would be conducted. Such 
common grounds do not exist in ernotivist society today, 
and they did not exist during the Enlightenment. 
Macintyre's failure to use a class analysis explains 
his understanding of the abandonment of the telos as 
purely an ideological abstraction. But the secular 
rejection of Protestant and Catholic theology along with 
the scientific and philosophical rejection of 
Aristotelianism were no mere products of theoretical 
discourse. An analysis of changing social and economic 
conditions must be undertaken before we can understand the 
motives behind the three philosophic projects he 
associates with the Enlightenment. Only then will we 
understand why moral disagreement arises. 
The concept of the telos could hold sway in classical 
Greece because a large part of that society was 
effectively prevented from participating in the political 
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life of the community. Hume recognized this in his 
critique on the notion of an "original contract." 
The republic of Athens was, I believe, the most 
extensive democracy, that we read of in history: 
Yet if we make the requisite allowances for the 
women, the slaves, and the strangers, we shall 
find, that that establishment was not, at first, 
made, nor any law ever voted, by a tenth part of 
those who were bound to pay obedience to it; Not 
to mention the islands and foreign dominions, 
which the Athenians claimed as theirs by right of 
conquest (Hume's Ethical Writings, p. 261). 
Citizenship, as such, existed solely among the male owners 
of property, the so-called "free" men of Athens. 
Mechanics and labourers, and much less slaves, were not 
accepted into the full community as "citizens"; they were 
thus not educated to the realization of their telos, for 
"it is quite impossible, while living the life of a 
mechanic or hireling, to occupy oneself as virtue demands" 
(Aristotle, p. 184). To maintain and perpetuate this 
subjugation by one class over society, it was necessary to 
promote a standard by which some semblance of rational and 
non-arbitrary deliberation in social matters could be 
identified and understood as possessing the requisite 
authority. What better way to enforce a standard based 
on class rule than to assert that this standard arose out 
of a metaphysical component, the telos? Adorned with 
both natural and mystic properties, the telos explained 
why some men were slaves and others not, why some were 
successful while others failed. A teleological standard 
provided stability and granted legitimacy to those holding 
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power in classical Greece. 
A similar practice was embodied in the Negro slave 
2 
codes of the antebellum American South. Conduct of the 
southern aristocracy was conditioned by its relationship 
with its direct source of income: slave-labour. The 
concept of "man-as-he-could-be-if-he-realized-his-telos" 
was replaced by the idea of "man-as-he-must-be-if-he-
shall-maintain-his-slaves." As Genovese wrote of the 
plantation South, "The master-slave relationship permeated 
Southern life and influenced relationships among free men" 
(Genovese, p. 13). Phillips also observed that "in 
virtually every American community where it [i.e. slavery] 
existed at all, the institution was first established by 
custom alone and was merely recognized by statutes when 
these came to be enacted" (Phillips, p. 489). Social 
relationships and legal statutes were thus developed 
subsequently to the implementation of the mode and 
relations of production based on slavery. 
Both the standard of the American slave codes and the 
teleological standard were held in strict observance so 
long as class rule was main ained and the organizational 
stability of society went unchallenged. And in both the 
plantation economy of the American South and in the slave 
economy of ancie t Greece, change in social status and 
relationship to the existing productive processes was 
limited. In this sense, the mode of production gives rise 
to the variety of relations and positions within a society 
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and conditions the relative movement of individuals in 
these relationships. Production on the basis of class 
stratification thus necessitates the use of ideological 
tools, such as the telos, to maintain this selfsame mode 
of production. Concepts of justice, rights, and freedom 
are therefore parametrically determined and thus 
conditioned by the necessities of a society's system of 
production. 
Marx recognized and understood the implications of 
class rule fully when explaining to the General Council of 
the First International in 1865 the futility of relying on 
appeals to abstract justice. On the contrary, it was a 
duty to themselves and to their fellow workers, insisted 
Marx, to confront the unrestrained power of their 
capitalists brethren. Not only should the workers attempt 
to alleviate the detrimental effects of the system but, 
moreover, their goal should be to abolish the wages system 
itself (Marx, Value, Price, and Profit, pp. 53-62). Marx 
was not speaking from a one-dimensional view of history 
rooted in idealist theory; instead, his judgment was 
informed by a historical perspective rooted in the real 
lives of men and women, in the structures and relations of 
production. Marx's perspective was not blind to the real 
basis for what passed as "law," "justice," and "the good" 
in bourgeois, or any previous, society, - hence his 
reproach: 
To clamour 
retribution 
for equal or even equitable 
on the basis of~he wages system is 
the same as to clamour for freedom on the basis 
of the slavery system. What you think just or 
equitable is out of the question. The question 
is: What is necessary and unavoidable with a 
given system of production (Marx, Value, Price, 
and Profit, pp. 39-40)? 
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His perspective clearly recognized the primacy of the mode 
of production as the determining factor which constituted 
behavioral and ideological standards prevailing in any 
society. As such, that class which controlled the means of 
production must necessarily establish its "law," its 
conception of "justice" and the "good" as the appropriate 
standard to be followed. 
Macintyre, on the contrary, uses an emotivist 
argument to reject this notion: 
Marx was of course mistaken in supposing that 
such disagreements over justice are merely 
secondary phenomena, that they merely reflect the 
interests of rival economic classes. Conceptions 
of justice and allegiance to such conceptions are 
partly constitutive of the lives of social 
groups, and economic interests are often 
partially defined in terms of such conceptions 
and not vice versa (AV, pp. 252-53). 
No argument follows to substantiate these claims which 
suggests that Macintyre's analytical approach itself may 
rests on an emotivist basis. Without any evidential 
support offered to back up his claims, he chooses instead 
to base their validity simply on the negation of Marx 
that is, the negation of a theory which is rooted in 
historical experience. 
The root of Macintyre's problem can be found in his 
infatuation with the intentions of individuals. Behaviour, 
for Macintyre, cannot be characterized independently of 
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intentions. Moreover, the intentions themselves cannot be 
characterized independently of the settings which give 
them an intelligibility. More specifically, he is 
interested in primary intentions such that if the 
individual had a contrary intention, different action 
would follow. Such intentions would link the agent with 
his intended actions. Macintyre states, 
we need to know both what certain of his 
beliefs are and which of them are causally 
effective; and, that is to say, we need to know 
whether certain contrary-to-fact hypothetical 
statements are true or false. And until we know 
this, we shall not know how to characterize 
correctly what the agent is doing (AV, p. 207). 
He presents the example of a man working in his 
garden. The question for Macintyre hinges on whether the 
man's primary intention is to put the garden in order for 
the winter or to please his wife by taking exercise. 
Depending on which intention is primary, only then can we 
understand and explain the behaviour in question. 
Intentions, thusly understood, have to be ordered 
both causally and temporally with references to settings 
and to descriptive terminology. Fur hermore, such 
research depends upon the correct identification of the 
agent's beliefs; lacking this, no understanding or 
explanation of the agent's activities is possible. 
Concludes Macintyre, "And what would be utterly doomed to 
failure would be the project of a science of, say, 
political behavior, detached from a study of intentions, 
beliefs and settings" (AV, p. 208). 
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This fixation with intentions, however, is 
constructed upon the vicissitudes of personal opinion, for 
what other manner can we gauge a subject's "true" 
intentions and hence classify correctly his beliefs? 
Explanation and understanding of his behaviour will be no 
more forthcoming should our gardener inform us that his 
primary intention is to serve God! Potentiality and thus 
behavior can only be understood in relation to the 
objective basis of the physical means at one's disposal, 
the definite pattern of social relations and knowledge of 
the physical environment in which a person operates, in 
addition to the past behavioral patterns of such an 
individual. Comprehension of one's essence is, therefore, 
not objectively possible. As such, one can readily see 
wherein the scientific rejection of Aristotelianism lay. 
Consequently, our understanding of this gardener 
cannot be left to rest solely on his individual 
intentions. The task of explanation will require 
examination of his specific relationship with regard to 
his objective material conditions of production and 
exchange. Material attachments and their relationship to 
the productive structure, therefore, must take precedence 
before comprehension of any moral bonding is possible. 
"Individuals producing in society," states Marx, "--hence 
socially determined individual production -- is, of 
course, the point of departure" (Marx, Grundrisse, p. 83). 
Intentions have meaning only within the context of 
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practical human activity; as such, they are the product of 
reflective thought and thus are secondary to social life. 
Preexisting social forms create the conditions in which 
intentional human activity either reproduces or transforms 
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these historical relations. Marx rebuffs this one-sided 
concern with intentions and follows with a discourse on 
the approach to be taken; he writes: 
In the social production of their life, men enter 
into definite relations that are indispensable 
and independent of their will, relations of 
production which correspond to a definite stage 
of development of their material productive 
forces. The sum total of these relations of 
production constitutes the economic structure of 
society, the real foundation, on which rises a 
legal and political superstructure and to which 
correspond defi ite forms of social 
consciousness. The mode of production of 
material life conditions the social, political, 
and intellectual life process in general. It is 
not the consciousness of men that determines 
their being, but, on the contrary, th ir social 
being that determines their consciousness (Marx, 
"Preface to A Critique of Political Economy," p. 
3 8 9) • 
Two aspects from this methodological exposition must 
be explained before the centrality of the concept of class 
can be understood. The "material productive forces" 
include human labour-power and the technical tate of 
development of the means of production. On the other 
hand, the "relations of production" are constituted by the 
economic ownership of the productive forces. And 
ownership in this sense implies effective control. When 
this ownership of the means of production is not held in 
common, an opposition is created. Thus the key condition 
35 
underlying the concept of class is "the direct 
relationship of the owners of the conditions of production 
to the immediate producers" (Marx, Capital, Volume III, 
Ch. 47, p. 927). 
The hostile opposition of millions of families living 
under economic conditions that separate their mode of life 
with its specific interests and peculiar culture and 
education from other similarly constituted groups of 
people characterizes the concept of class. As Engels 
noted, "these warring classes of society are always the 
products of the modes of production and exchange -- in a 
word, of the economic conditions of their time" (Engels, 
p. 45). Thus, from the point of departure of individuals 
producing in society (i.e. the structure of social 
relations within the material economic structure) as the 
real basis of scientific study coupled with an 
understanding of the dialectic of class opposition, we can 
then proceed to explain the transforma ion of structural 
and ideological forms. States Marx, 
Had 
Just as our opinion of an individual is not based 
on what he thinks of himself, so can we not judge 
of such a period of transformation by its own 
consciousness; on the contrary, this con-
sciousness must be explained rather from the 
contradictions of material life, from the 
existing conflict between the social productive 
forces and the relations of production (Marx, 
"Preface to A Critique of Political Economy," p. 
39 0) • 
lv1acin tyre' s analysis been formed from such a 
perspective rather than the speculative idealism he 
pursues, we would derive a different and fuller accounting 
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of the Enlightenment project and its rejection of 
Aristotelianism. To this I now turn. 
IV. THE DAWN OF THE AGE OF REASON & 
THE LOSS OF 'OBJECTIVE' STANDARDS 
Every form of society and government then 
existing, every old traditional notion was flung 
into the lumber-room as irrational; the world had 
hitherto allowed itself to be led solely by 
prejudices; everything in the past deserved only 
pity and contempt (Engels, Socialism: Utopian 
and Scientific, p. 29). 
Macintyre takes us back nearly 300 years 
eighteenth-century Europe engaged in formulating 
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to 
a 
rational justification for morality. He thinks that the 
Enlightenment had little to do with French cultural 
history; in fact, he says, France was "the most backward 
of the enlightened nations" (AV, p. 37). The French 
looked toward English models, which in turn were 
overshadowed by the achievements of the Scottish 
Enlightenment. The French Revolution thus did not have 
major implications for the alteration of ighteenth-
century morality and did not play a central role in the 
Enlightenment. No mention is made of the 'Rights of Man' 
arising in this 'Age of Reason' nor of the new bourgeois 
class's assertion that everything must now be subjected to 
the new moral standard of abstract "reason." Rather, the 
French Revolution was "an attempt to enter by political 
means this North European culture [i.e. that of the 
eighteenth-century Scottish, English, Dutch, Danish and 
Prussian intellectuals] and so to abolish the gap between 
French ideas and French social and political life" (AV, p. 
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3 7) • 
English, Scottish and German thinkers including Hume, 
Smith, Kant and Mozart in addition to the less well-known 
Adam Ferguson, John Millar and Lord Monboddo are all part 
of this vibrant north European culture. These contributors 
to the "Enlightenment Project" were "at home in the social 
world" as opposed to the French intelligentsia who were "a 
group at once educated and alienated." And yet, "most of 
the eighteenth-century French intelligentsia ha[d] the 
will to belong to it [i.e. north European culture], in 
spite of the differences in their situation" (AV, p. 37). 
The primary 
therefore, 
Protestant 
responsibility for the Enlightenment, 
was actually rooted in the secularized 
northern European culture interested 
4 
in 
formulating a justification of moral belief. 
Prior to this Enlightenment undertaking, the word 
'moral' was not in the language asserts Macintyre. 
Beginning, however, with the period from 1630 to 1850, the 
word 'morality' came into usage to designate that sphere 
'in which rules of conduct which are neither theological 
nor legal nor aesthetic are allowed a cultural space of 
their own" (AV, p. 3 9) • With the "moral sphere" 
distinguished from these latter spheres, the project of an 
independent rational justification of morality thus became 
not only the concern of philosophers but was central to 
European culture itself. The failure to deal with this 
"problem" then culminated with the reduction of all 
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justification of morality into Kierkegaard's concept of 
ultimate choice. This, we remember, entailed the choosing 
by each of us of either the deontological standards of the 
ethical way of life or the submission to the passions in 
the aesthetic way of life. And since no reason could 
logically serve as a first principle, this contradiction 
confirms the failure of the Enlightenment Project to 
provide a rational vindication of morality. And "from 
henceforward the morality of our predecessor culture 
and subsequently of our own lacked any public, shared 
rationale or justification" (AV, p. 50). In such a 
situation, Aristotelianisrn with its standardized 
conception of human nature understood as naturally guiding 
us toward our specific and certain aims and goals -- our 
telos -- could not survive. 
Macintyre's account of the Enlightenment and the rise 
of ernotivisrn makes no mention of the overthrow of feudal 
society by the new industrial class with its assemblage of 
free-traders. His account owes little if anything to the 
bourgeois severance of the political and social domination 
of the feudal aristocracy. And nothing is spoken of the 
subversion of Church authority by this confident new class 
and its replacement with state authority rooted in 
nationalism. The Enlightenment turns merely on the 
separation of the moral from the theological, legal, and 
aesthetic spheres. But to see this distinction is not to 
explain how or why it developed. This transformation in 
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belief systems is not seen as having its basis in class 
conflict with a contending class attempting to impose its 
own belief system upon society and succeeding in its task. 
Instead, this is simply interpreted as the passage from a 
society where objective standards for morality prevailed 
to one where emotivism took root and individual personal 
preference became the order of the day. 
Macintyre is unable to understand the particular 
characteristic of the bourgeois epoch as that of a 
constant revolutionizing of the means of production. In 
contradistinction from previous historical epochs, the 
bourgeois mode of production rested upon an uninterrupted 
disturbance of all social conditions leaving everlasting 
uncertainty and agitation in their wake. Transformation 
of the labour process and its material conditions depends 
first on the formal subsumption of the labour process to 
capital. The key distinction here in relation to the 
feudal labour process is that the capitalist is the 
manager of production and directs the labour process for 
the sole purpose of using money to make more money. The 
labour process thus becomes the "instrument of the 
valorization process, the process of the self-valorization 
of capital -- the manufacture of surplus-value" (Marx, 
Capital, V. !' Appendix, p. 1019). This is followed by 
the real subsumption of labour under capital with the 
5 
production of relative surplus-value. 
Capitalist production attains its specificity at this 
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point transforming the labour process and its actual 
conditions to a technological basis. Socialized labour 
comes into being with the division of labour in the 
workshop. Machinery and the conscious use of the sciences 
are applied to the development of technology to increase 
the value of surplus-labour resulting in an increase in 
the scale of production. The capitalist, in his drive for 
the maximization of profit, constantly aims to have as 
much unpaid labour as possible in the final product. 
This, as Marx indicated, is achieved "only by producing 
for the sake of production" (Marx, Capital, V. .!_, 
Appendix, p. 103 8) • Hence a constantly repeated 
revolution takes place in the mode of production, in the 
productivity of the workers and in the relations between 
workers and capitalists (Marx, Capital, ~ lr Appendix, p. 
1035). As Marx and Engels stated it in the Manifesto, 
All fixed, fast-frozen relations, with their 
train of ancient and venerable prejudices and 
opinions, are swept away, all new-formed ones 
become antiquated before they can ossify. All 
that is solid melts into air, all that is holy is 
profaned, and man is at last compelled to face 
with sober senses his real conditions of life and 
his relations with his kind (Marx & Engels, The 
Communist Manifesto, p. 12). 
Macintyre, however, attributes the demise of "objective" 
standards to the mere separation of the moral sphere from 
the theological, legal, and aesthetic. The eighteenth-
century philosophers, therefore, were engaged in an 
unsuccessful project from the start, for the moral 
injunctions they inherited were incompatible with an 
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expressly designed discrepent conception of human nature. 
As a consequence, Macintyre tells us nothing with 
regard to the French Revolution as a symbol of class 
conflict. Rather than understand France as being at the 
forefront of the Enlightenment Project, he likens it to a 
cultural backwater whose alienated intellectuals "have to 
wait for the nineteenth-century Russians before they find 
any counterpart elsewhere" (AV, p. 3 7) • Such a 
conclusion, one might say, initially sugg sts a preference 
for Burke's Reflections on the Revolution in France over 
that of Paine's Rights of Man though we find out later 
that Burke too is part of the problem (cf. AV, p. 222). 
Indeed, Macintyre's interpretation of the initial stages 
of the French Revolution as an attempt by French 
intellectuals "to enter by political means this North 
European culture" (AV, p. 37) is totally devoid of a 
social analysis of contending classes attempting to impose 
their rule. Further, there is no mention of the 
conflicting modes of production which gave rise to these 
contentious classes. And rather than view the previous 
feudal belief system for what it was -- an imposition of 
the will of the Church and the landed aristocracy he 
rather implies that this was a harmonious time in wh i ch an 
"objective" standard prevailed. 
It is true that North European culture had already 
experienced the bourgeois revolution in the Netherlands in 
the sixteenth century. So too had it undergone the two 
seventeenth-century revolutions in England 
affected by the American revolution in the 
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and been 
eighteenth 
century. But what sets off the French Revolution from 
these others, and thus from North European culture in 
general, and what gives it special importance in terms of 
the Enlightenment is that these other revolutions ended in 
what Soboul calls a conservative compromise which 
safeguarded "the supremacy of wealth beneath the cover of 
'bourgeois freedom'. This was not so in the French 
Revolution, when "equality in law took first place before 
everything" (Soboul, p. 7). Thus while North European 
culture rested on a compromise between the bourgeoisie and 
the aristocracy, the French Revolution struck a mortal 
blow at this construction of a social hierarchy based on 
wealth. And in the area of political liberty, the French 
Revolution not only allowed the Protestant and Jew to live 
in the community but also by creating a civil constitution 
in 1792 "gave every citizen the right to live without 
religion" (Soboul, p. 11). 
But what is most significant about the French 
Revolution than any other at the time is that it swept 
away the last vestiges of feudal society and with it the 
feudal system of production and exchange. In its place 
"the French Revolution unreservedly proclaimed free 
enterprise and freedom of profit, thereby opening the way 
to capitalism" (Soboul, p. 9). This is the defining 
characteristic of the Enlightenment, and the consolidation 
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of this project by the French Revolution is what 
characterizes its significance and preeminence. And the 
dramatic nature of the class struggle in France is owed to 
the contradictory nature between the obstinacy of the 
aristocracy hesitant to give up its privileged feudal 
orders and seigneurial rights of control over the 
peasantry and the firm opposition of the masses to any 
perpetuation of privilege based on class distinctions. 
Thus the events in France during and following the 1789 
Revolution were not only of direct symbolic value to the 
Enlightenment but, moreover, these events portend the 
future direction this struggle was to take. Rather than 
consisting solely in an ideological abstraction of 
secularized Protestant north European culture seeking a 
justification of moral belief, the consolidation of 
capitalism and its mode of production, therefore, is seen 
as central to an understanding of the Enlightenment. 
The fallacy of Macintyre's analysis lies in not 
recognizing the predominance of the productive forces over 
the cultural. Attacks on the feudal heirarchy could not be 
sustained until small traders could establish themselves 
outside of the closed medieval guilds so as to attain some 
distance from the power of the Church and the landed 
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nobles. Marx and Engels located the origin of this 
independent trader in the person of the chartered burgher, 
a product of the earliest towns the chartered boroughs 
(Marx & Engels, The Communist Manifesto, p. 9). The 
.. 
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burgher's capital, secured through trade and usury, was to 
lay the foundation for industrial capital and transform 
him and others like him into a class-for-itself -- the 
modern bourgeoisie. The burgeoning bourgeoisie flourished 
once the manufacturing system took hold and supplanted the 
guild-masters. As such, the "division of labor between 
the different corporate guilds vanished in the face of 
division of labor in each sing~e workshop" (Marx & Engels, 
The Communist Manifesto, p. 10) • With the colonization of 
America and the subsequent trade which resulted in 
addition to the East Indian and Chinese markets, the 
replication of the chartered burgher and his 
transformation into a unified class was inevitable. 
It is this transformation in the mode of production 
which explains the subsequent ideological conflict. The 
contradictions in the different modes of production 
divided society forcing an assertion of claims and counter 
claims only to be resolved in favor of the newer more 
productive forces. The productive ability to create ever 
more goods would necessarily come into conflict with 
society's legal arrangements. Thus when the latter became 
a "fetter" on the new productive forces, revolution \'/as 
inevitable. 
The old feudal relations of production were 
hierarchically structured on established roles which 
subjugated serfs to their 'natural superiors under God' 
and journeymen and apprentices to the guild master. Hence 
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while serfs laboured in a mode consistent with the feudal 
organization of agriculture, journeymen and apprentices 
became artisans within the guild structure of medieval 
towns. Seeking to maintain these relations, the feudal 
organization of the countryside combined with the guild 
organization of the towns to prevent capital formed by 
usury and commerce from turning into industrial capital. 
This in combination with the restricted access to markets 
granted by early town formations solely to guilds became 
antiquated and a hindrance to the newly developed forces 
of manufacturing with its own conditions of production. 
But as Marx observed, there is always "one specific kind 
of production which predominates over the rest, whose 
relations thus assign rank and influence to the others" 
(Marx, Grundrisse, pp. 106-7). In this respect, the 
feudal mode of production concerned only with immediate 
use-value could not compete with organized capital 
producing solely for the attainment of exchange value. 
Thus, concluded Marx and Engels, "the feudal relations of 
property . became so many fetters. They had to be 
burst asunder; they were burst asunder" (Marx & Engels, 
The Communist Manifesto, p. 14). 
Corresponding to the development of the bourgeoisie, 
there grew an ever-increasing number of proletarians. 
Uprooted from their lands and forced onto the labour-
market, these proletarians, on pain of starvation, entered 
into "free" competition with other landless peasants in 
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the sale of their labour-power. The dissolution of the 
bands of feudal retainers was hastened by royal power 
itself in its drive for absolute sovereignty. In 
conjunction with this, the enclosure movement of the 
latter fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries facilitated 
the expropriation of the agricultural population. It is 
here that the common lands, which the serfs were co-
proprietors of, were usurped by the great feudal lords 
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themselves. The Reformation added to this expropriation, 
for when the property of the Catholic Church was taken 
over in the sixteenth century, it was sold off to 
speculating farmers and townsmen who forcibly evicted the 
previous sub-tenants and confiscated their holdings (Marx, 
Capital, ~ I, Ch. 2 7, p. 8 8 2) • The significance of this 
expropriation of Church lands was the loss of the previous 
legitimation of feudal property. As Marx noted: 
The property of the church formed the religious 
bulwark of the old conditions of landed property. 
With its fall, these conditions could no longer 
maintain their existence (Marx, Capital, V. !, 
Ch. 27, p. 883). 
With the legitimation of feudal property now mortally 
wounded, this expropriation of lands and land transfers 
quickened rapidly following the Glorious Revolution of 
1688. The crown lands were either given away, sold 
cheaply, or annexed to private estates, Marx tells us, all 
without "the slightest observance of legal etiquette" 
(Marx, Capital, Y..!_ _!, Ch. 2 7, p. 8 84) • 
The result of this expropriation of people from the 
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soil casting them out onto the labour-rnarket as "free and 
rightless proletarians" was two-fold. Firstly, 
legislation appeared which treated these peasants as 
'voluntary' criminals assuming that it was within their 
powers to go on working under the old conditions which 
were no longer present. Secondly, a general forcing down 
of wages resulted due to the large reserve army of labour 
created for the needs of industry (Marx, Capital, V. I' 
Ch. 28, pp. 896-904). In such circumstances, applying the 
notion of the telos to masses of "free labourers" would 
have constituted a hindrance to the myth of their freedom. 
It is here that wage-labour reveals itself as the 
modus operandi of capitalism. From hence forth, the 
relations between "free men" would be conducted in the 
manner of cash payment for labour rendered. Thus, if we 
must speak of the "project" of securing a rational 
justification for morality during the Enlightenment, it 
must acknowledge its origin as a rising out of the 
establishment of a class of workers dependent on wages for 
their livelihood, for "the sale and purchase of labour-
power is," admits Marx, "the absolute foundation of 
capitalist production 11 (Marx, Capital, V. .!.' 
Appendix, p. 1005). He adds: 
Without a class dependent on wages, the moment 
individuals confront each other as free persons, 
there can be no production of surplus-value; 
without the production of surplus-value there can 
be no capitalist production, and hence no capital 
and no capitalist (Marx, Capital, V. !' p. 1005) 1 
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Wage-labour is thus the origin of ernotivism, for it 
is in this manner that all feudal, patriarchal, and 
idyllic relations lose their force. In instituting wage-
labour as the basis of its new relations of production, 
the bourgeoisie 
has pitilessly torn asunder the motley feudal 
ties that bound man to his "natural superiors," 
and has left no other bond between man and man 
than naked self-interest, than callous "cash 
payment." It has drowned the most heavenly 
ecstasies of religious fervor, of chivalrous 
enthusiasm, of philistine sentimentalism, in the 
icy water of egotistical calcula ion. It has 
resolved personal worth into exchange value, and 
in place of the numberless indefeasible chartered 
freedoms, has set up that single, unconscionable 
freedom -- Free Trade. In one word, for 
exploitation, veiled by religious and political 
illusions, it has substituted naked, shameless, 
direct, brutal exploitation (Marx & Engels, The 
Communist Manifesto, p.ll). 
The wage-labourer must now confront the capitalist as 
owner of the means of production who can hire and fire him 
at whim so long as his extraction of surplus-value remains 
constant in relation to any would-be competitors. Under 
these conditions the worker discovers that the period of 
time for which he is "free" is the period of time in which 
he is forced to sell his labour-power. It is 
understandable why the capitalist feels secure in this 
relationship and "smirks self-importantly and is intent on 
business" while the wage-labourer "is timid and holds 
back, like someone who has brought his own hide to market 
and now has nothing else to expect but -- a tanning" 
(Marx, Capital, ~ i 1 Ch. 6, p. 280). Telling the workers 
that they were "free" on the one hand and that it was 
50 
their specific telos on the other which drew them to 
labour in such conditions would therefore have been 
contradictory and counterproductive to the consolidation 
of bourgeois power. 
Lacking a class analysis, it is understandable how 
Macintyre fails to see that the supposed "objective" and 
"impersonal" ethical standards of feudal and pre-feudal 
societies were in essence the product of individual 
decisions and wills which united as a class to maintain 
dominance and rule. Moreover, this ommission in his 
analysis is responsible for his crediting of the 
Enlightenment Project as a purely intellectual phenomenon 
undertaken to secure a justification for moral belief 
rather than the product of capitalist development. As a 
result, French cultural and political life plays no major 
role in Macintyre's account of the Enlightenment. A class 
analysis, however, would have demonstrated to him that the 
successful challenge of the French bourgeoisie over the 
landed aristocracy and the Church both symbolized and 
fueled the subsequent project of formulating a social 
philosophy to justify the newly ascendant relations of 
production and exchange. Devoid of such an analysis, the 
abandonment of Aristotle and the subsequent decline into 
ernotivism are, therefore, reason enough for Macintyre to 
chastise the Enlightenment philosophers for not solving 
their "problems." 
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V. THE DEVELOPMENT OF EMOTIVISM FROM A MATERIALIST PERSPECTIVE 
The materialist conception of history starts from 
the proposition that the production of the means 
to support human life and, next to production, 
the exchange of things produced, is the basis of 
all social structure; that in every society that 
has appeared in history, the manner in which 
wealth is distributed and society divided into 
classes or orders is dependent upon what is 
produced, how it is produced, and how the 
products are exchanged (Engels, Socialism: 
Utopian and Scientific, p. 46). 
The concept of a moral tradition in modern society is 
an alien concept. We lack any clear criterion or "any 
clear consensus, either as to the place of virtue concepts 
relative to other moral concepts, or as to which 
dispositions are to be included within the catalogue of 
the virtues or the requirements imposed by particular 
virtues" (AV, p. 226). We thus lack any narrative unity 
in our daily lives. Our culture has relegated art to a 
"minority activity." Our economy has facilitated the 
movement of work outside the household and seen it "put to 
the service of impersonal capital." As a consequence, our 
work has been separated "from everything but the service 
of biological survival and the reproduction of the labor 
force, on the one hand, and that of institutionalized 
acquisitiveness, on the other" (AV, p. 227). In such a 
situation there is little room for social bonds to 
develop; individuals therefore are primary and society is 
secondary in this equation. This last point is 
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illustrated by contrasting the incommensurable concepts of 
justice of both John Rawls and Robert Nozick. Observes 
Macintyre: 
Not surprisingly it is a consequence of this that 
their views exclude any account of human 
community in which the notion of desert in 
relation to contributions to the common tasks of 
that community in purs[u]ing shared goods could 
provide the basis for judgments about virtue and 
injustice (AV, p. 251). 
Macintyre concludes that modern politics is engaged 
in a civil war where a genuine moral consensus cannot be 
obtained, for our society is totally devoid of any shared 
moral first principles (AV, p. 253). On this account he 
is most correct. His recommendation, however, is for the 
rejection of "modern systematic politics, whether liberal, 
conservative, radical or socialist" p. 2 55) • 
Moreover, a parallel exists between present-day Europe and 
North America and the "epoch in which the Roman Empire 
declined into the Dark Ages" (AV, p. 263). Just as 
Romans of good will ceased to equate the continuation of 
civility and moral community with the maintenance of the 
Roman imperium, so too should such a distinction be made 
between the notion of community and the modern state. 
This is necessary, Macintyre states, for: 
What matters at this stage is the construction of 
local forms of community within which civility 
and the intellectual and moral life can be 
sustained through the new dark ages which are 
already upon us. And if the tradition of the 
virtues was able to survive the horrors of the 
last dark ages, we are not entirely without 
grounds for hope. This time however the 
barbarians are not waiting beyond the frontiers; 
they have already been governing us for quite 
• 
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some time (AV, p. 263). 
The reactionary tone of this last statement clearly 
illustrates that Macintyre fears his way of life and all 
that it stands for is threatened. what is interesting is 
that he argues for the formation of local conrrnunities to 
sustain moral life; but was it not his main thesis that 
moral life had for the most part disappeared? If so, from 
what sections of American and European life will he draw 
from, and how can these communities be maintained? But is 
it really "moral life" which is threatened, or rather a 
particular mode of life that of the contemporary 
8 
bourgeoisie in the last stages of capitalism? 
It is not by coincidence that the type of 
Macintyre describes as lacking shared mora~ 
society 
first 
principles accurately depicts modern c api talis tic society 
in the United States. It is here in the u.s. that art is 
relegated to a secondary activity and where consumerism 
has been institutionalized. And it is here more than 
elsewhere that work is put to the service of impersonal 
capital. It is thus understandable why the supreme value 
given to 
characterize 
"free enterprise" and hence 
"freedom" as the freedom to 
wage-labour 
exp1oi t those 
without capital. And in this one aspect the standard of 
wage-labour is pitted against the ranks of organized and 
unorganized wage-labour. Though our society is devoid of 
a standard of first principles, the dominant bourgeois 
class is nonetheless able to maintain its rule through the 
p 
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standard of wage-labour. 
Modern American society, rooted in the primacy of 
private property with society organized to the service of 
private capital can trace its direct roots to that same 
society which spawned the Enlightenment. It is a fuller 
development of that movement which uprooted the peasants, 
freemen, and serfs from agriculture and transferred them 
"from means of production of the individual into social 
means of production only workable by a collectivity of 
men" (Engels, p. 48). As such, this inability to agree on 
a standard of first principles is not due to the failure 
of Enlightenment philosophers. 
But what makes the emotivist nature of contemporary 
moral discourse so apparent lies in the evolutionary 
development of the modern proletariat. A virtual 
revolution has occurred in material conditions, and some 
notable gains have been made in the establishment of laws 
to protect workers relative to the early days of 
capitalism. Alterations have occurred in the actual 
conditions of the work force with the abolition of child 
labour to the increase in mean life expectancy of workers 
-- gains won through organization, struggle, and the 
revolutionizing of the productive forces. Though private 
capital still holds the upper hand in this relationship, 
it cannot act with its former impunity, for definite 
expectations accompany these gains in the objective 
conditions of workers. 
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In this respect, a certain level of material 
conditions and a certain conduct in social relations 
acquire the status of "rights," the denial of which are 
recognized as "facts." Macintyre's initial criticism of 
Gewirth is correct in that there is no such thing as 
"rights" in any objective sense. On the other hand, 
"rights" do become part of the public consciousness and 
find their existence expressed in the form of definite 
social and political expectations and patterns of 
behavior. Though political equality is still illusory as 
long as social inequalities persist, the fact that 
constitutional guarantees of political equality have been 
won in the U.S. is indicative of the degree of struggle 
waged by working people. The basis for this struggle was 
established with the 13th, 14th, and 15th Amendments to 
the Constitution adopted in the wake of the Union military 
victory in 1865. These amendments abolished chattel-
slavery, extended the democratic guarantees of the 
original ten amendments constituting the Bill of Rights, 
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and extended the voting franchise respectively. 
Continuing struggle on the part of workers has 
brought about new interpretations of these Constitutional 
"rights" extending the "equal protection of the law" 
provision of the 14th Amendment to blacks, women, Latinos, 
undocumented workers, youth, the handicapped, veterans, 
and others. Denial of these rights and other gains made 
by workers either through the busting of unions, the 
p 
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demolition of social programs, or increasing the pool of 
the unemployed are actions which bring out the true nature 
of the capitalist state to all workers. In response to 
these provocations, workers recognize that they possess a 
collective power in equality and solidarity and are able 
to fight these attempts to reestablish antiquated forms of 
subjugation. As such, the consciousness of the 
proletariat as a class-for-itself is extended. Forms of 
subjugation which previously went unquestioned now are 
cast off as fetters. The class struggle thus begins anew 
and continues at a different level. 
In this milieu, the claims of private capital must 
walk a careful line so as not to be exposed for the 
organized theft which it is. Rational justifications of 
the necessary conditions for capitalism -- wage-labour, 
reserve armies of labour, and the predominance of private 
property -- are not as a rule propagated to the mass 
public for consumption. And profit -- the unpaid labour 
surplus extracted in the realm of production -- must be 
hidden in various concealed trusts or cloaked behind a 
plethora of subsidiaries and management corporations. And 
all of these devices belie the immense concentratio of 
10 
wealth in this country. And the protection of such 
concentrated wealth must operate under conditions which 
are in no way reflected by the expressed public interests 
at stake. Hence, foreign military campaigns from Vietnam 
to Grenada and support for dictators from Somoza, 
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Stroessner and Pinochet to Botha, Mobutu and Baby Doc 
Duvalier all must masquerade as serving the interests of 
freedom and democracy rather than revealed for the terror 
network it is and the degree of repression it supports. 
And, yet, even here private capital is restricted more 
than it once was twenty or more years ago. No longer can 
u.s. forces openly invade the Dominican Republic or u.s. 
Marines occupy Nicaragua for years at a stretch without 
expecting tremendous opposition both domestic and foreign. 
And no longer can the bugaboo of communism be counted on 
to incite support among the masses for jingoistic 
campaigns abroad. Revelations of such activities, when 
and if they do become public, are reason enough for 
workers to be skeptical about the "national interests" at 
stake and thus reluctant to participate in protecting such 
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interests. 
This is the society in which emotivism reaches its 
fullest development, where subordination of a continuously 
evolving and expanding working class must masquerade for 
other than what it actually is. Private capital under 
these circumstances is not powerful enough to impose its 
rule without organized opposition. As such, the rhetoric 
and justification of society 1 s rulers -- the assertion of 
the naked will -- filters throughout society to serve as a 
basis on which to judge and to act for those whose 
interests the system serves. It is here that the 
capitalist nature of the system and the primary role which 
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money plays in this society facilitates the breakdown of 
any shared rationale or conception of virtues. Any 
semblance of a shared morality is obliterated by 
encouraging intra-class as well as inter-class 
exploitation. As Buchanan explains, 
In the labor process, the worker sells the use of 
his capacities, the control over his mind and 
body to the capitalist. Thus the labor process 
accustoms the worker to think of human capacities 
as saleable. Further, the use of money makes it 
possible to price and purchase all human 
capacities -- sexual capacities as well as 
capacities for industrial operations in the labor 
process. Finally, both the meagerness of his 
wage and the bourgeois ethic of "self-
improvement" encourage the worker to exploit his 
wife and children in the way in which the 
capitalist exploits him (Buchanan, p. 40). 
But to recognize the origin of this exploitative emotive 
quality in contemporary social relations as well as in 
contemporary argument requires the understanding which a 
class analysis provides. And such an analysis recognizes 
the primacy of the material forces and relations of 
production and exchange as that which gives rise to a 
society's conception of justice, the good, and sets 
standards for behavior. 
Macintyre takes arx to task on this account f or 
embodying the origin of ideology "in a set of law-like 
generalizations which link the material conditions and 
class structures of societies as kinds of cause to 
ideologically informed beliefs as kinds of effect" (AV, p. 
11 0) • This is an example of a "would-be social science" 
which " both misrepresents the form of the actual 
59 
discoveries of social scientists and itself functions as a 
disguised expression of arbi tra. ry preference" (AV, p. 
110). In this manner, Macintyre links Marxism with 
liberal individualism for embodying .. the ethos of the 
distinctively modern and modernizing world" (AV, p. x). 
Likewise, Marx and Engels' diagnosis of capitalist 
society, oriented as it is in the law-like generalizations 
of historical materialism, is merely a symptom of our 
current predicament which alLows the form of moral 
utterance to be used as a mask "for almost any face" (AV, 
p. 110). 
What Macintyre fails to grasp is that to the extent 
these generalizations 
conditioned by the 
are "arbitrary," they are no less 
of relationship o :f the forces 
production with the relations of production. There cannot 
be a mechanical predetermination of each historical 
struggle 
however, 
in any objective sense. 
relationally determined 
These struggles are, 
by the situation of 
ownership and control which the actors themselves possess 
or not vis- .... a-vis the means of production. We can further 
say that no alternative set of social relations is 
possible unless and until the material productive means 
necessary to sustain such a form of society have been 
developed. Thus, ideas cannot be reduced to matter, but 
we can say that the ideal and the material world are 
opposites existing within a unity in which the material is 
basic. 
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Such an understanding, however, would require a 
dialectical perspective which analyzes "all things and all 
phenomena in their continuous change, while determining in 
the material conditions of those changes that critical 
limit beyond which 'A' ceases to be 'A' ••. "(Trotsky, p. 
49) • As Trotsky points out, if a thing does not change, 
it does not exist, for time is a fundamental element of 
existence. When quantitative changes are negligible, as 
when a buyer and seller exchange a pound of sugar, we can 
presume for the task at hand, that "A" is equal to "A." 
But outside of these certain limits when quantitative 
changes become converted into qualitative differences, as 
when ice melts into water or a pound of sugar is subjected 
to the action of water or kerosene, we can no longer 
presume that "A" is equal to "A." It is in terms of 
process that the dialectic is understood as a series of 
contradictions between interpenetrating opposite elements 
rather than in mechanical terms. When Macintyre speaks of 
law-like generalizations, he insists on a metaphysical 
division of reality into concrete generalizations or 
categories. In contrast, 
dialectical thought grasps conceptual forms in 
their systematic interconnections, not just their 
determinate differences, and conceives each 
development as the product of a previous less 
developed phase, whose necessary truth or 
fulfillment it is; so that there is always a 
tension, latent irony or incipient surprise 
between any form and what it is in the process of 
becoming (Bottomore, et al., p. 122). 
Rejecting the mechanical notions of the scientific 
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revolution and the Enlightenment, Marx's dialectic 
recognizes that reality is a differentiated unity which is 
specifically contradictory. It therefore consists of "the 
conflict of opposites driving reality onwards in a 
historical process of constant progressive change, both 
evolutionary and revolutionary . • • " (Bottomore, et al., 
p. 12 0) . And contrary to Hegel's mystification in 
idealism, Marx's materialism allows him to present the 
general forms of motion of the dialectic in a 
comprehensive manner which does link ideological forms to 
their materialistic origins. The method to follow, 
therefore, consists of 
a methodological commitment to the empirically-
controlled investigation of the causal relations 
within and between historically emergent, 
developing humanity and irreducibly real, but 
modifiable nature (Bottomore, et al., p. 123). 
The dialectic therefore directs scientific analysis, 
and explanation of the latter consists in terms of the 
contradictory nature of the material and social relations 
in which they are generated. Dialectical materialism, 
thusly understood, is "not a science but a philosophy and 
a method of thought. It is not a part of Marxism but a 
separate entity allied to Marxism" (Cameron, p. xii). 
Thus, the generalizations of historical materialism, 
rooted in an understanding of social and material 
contradictions in recognition of the fact that matter acts 
in dialectical ways, do not misrepresent the form of 
actual discoveries by social scientists. Rather, 
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historical materialism provides a scientific basis in 
which the empirical aspects of such discoveries can be 
tested and verified. Consequently, the theoretical 
generalizations arising out of this method do not function 
as disguised expressions of arbitrary preference; on the 
contrary, they describe the real moving forces of 
development and historical change. 
Rejecting the materialist perspective of Marxism, 
Macintyre thus goes on to praise Nietzche for his 
"historic achievement to understand more clearly than any 
other philosopher . • . not only that what purported to be 
appeals to objectivity were in fact expressions of 
subjective will, but also the Nature of the problems that 
this posed for moral philosophy" (AV, p. 113). As such, 
Nietzche's moral philosophy is counterposed as the only 
other "genuine theoretical alternative" to Macintyre's own 
philosophy (AV, p. 110). This is so, asserts Macintyre, 
because Nietzche was able to successfully critique all of 
the new rational secular foundations for morality arising 
out of the Enlightenment project and perhaps even of all 
previous morality. But because Aristotle's thought was at 
the core of what was repudiated from the fifteenth to the 
seventeenth centuries and because this is what set the 
stage for Nietzche, he defense of the Nietzchean position 
hinges on the question of whether "was it right in the 
first place to reject Aristotle" (AV, p. 117)? With this, 
Macintyre undertakes the key task of his book by 
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attempting to vindicate Aristotle's ethics, "or something 
very like it" (AV, p. 118). 
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VI. RESURRECTION OF THE TELOS OR THE MASKING OF CLASS RULE 
In no other country has there been such rejection 
of the class struggle as in the land of 
"unlimited opportunity." The denial of social 
contradictions as the moving force of development 
led to the denial of the dialectic as the logic 
of contradictions in the domain of theoretical 
thought. Just as in the sphere of politics it 
was thought possible everybody could be convinced 
of the correctness of a "just" program by means 
of clever syllogisms and society could be 
reconstructed through "rational" measures, so in 
the sphere of theory it was accepted as proved 
that Aristotelian logic, lowered to the level of 
"common sense," was sufficient for the solution 
of all questions (Trotsky, In Defense of Marxism, 
pp. 43-44). 
Macintyre gives us an account of heroic societies 
such as early Greek society as depicted by Horner in the 
Iliad and the Odyssey and of those described in the sagas 
of Iceland and Ireland. In these societies, every 
individual has a given role and status in a highly-
structured and ordered social framework. In addition to 
particular duties and privileges attaching to each status 
or order, there was also an understanding of the necessary 
actions required to perform these duties and privileges. 
Of especial importance is the way in which the heroic 
virtues were tied together with the social structure. 
"Morality and social structure are in fact one and the 
same in heroic society. There is only one set of social 
bonds. Morality as something distinct does not yet exist" 
(AV, p. 123). What to do and how to judge are not left to 
speculation or individual preference; they are matters of 
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social fact. Thus to define a particular social role is 
also to define those virtues attached to that role which 
enjoins the person who occupies the role. Questions of 
choice may arise within the framework, but the framework 
is a priori and cannot be chosen. The heroic self 
contrasted with the self as conceived by modern 
philosophers cannot be detached from a particular 
standpoint and is thus unable to judge the standpoint from 
a removed perspective. To aspire to free morality from 
all particularity as conceptualized in the modern self, 
therefore, is an illusion, for the virtues can only be 
possessed as part of an inherited tradition (AV, pp. 126-
7). Consequently, in juxtaposing the claim of an 
objective standpoint on the part of heroic societies to 
that of Nietzche, Macintyre claims that an incompatibility 
exists between the two because: "What Nietzche portrays is 
aristocratic self-assertion; what Homer and the sagas show 
are forms of assertion proper to and required by a certain 
role" (AV, p. 129). Nietzche is faulted, therefore, for 
projecting the milieu of nineteenth-century individualism 
onto the Homeric past. 
By the fifth century B.C.E., social transformation 
had resulted not only in conflict between different sets 
of virtues but, moreover, rival conceptions of particular 
virtues coexisted. Forms of the Homeric view of virtue 
survived, but the standpoint was no longer defined by 
those same Homeric values. Consequently, "the conception 
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of a virtue has now become strikingly detached from that 
of any particular social role" (AV, pp. 13 2-3) . Thus, 
while his Homeric predecessor lacked rival conceptions by 
which to question the life of his community, conflict 
between virtues provided the fifth-century Athenian with 
standards by which to inquire into the justness of 
particular practices and policies. His understanding was 
still possible, however, only because of his membership in 
the community. 
What characterized these different and rival sets, 
attitudes, and definitions of the virtues is that they 
were exercised within the shared context of the city-state 
and the agon. The agon was understood as a contest which 
by the fifth-century in Athens took the forms of Olympic 
games between city-states, debates in the assemblies and 
law courts, conflicts in Greek tragedy, and the dialogue 
form of philosophical argument. What each of these areas 
of Greek life provided were a context by which the 
different conceptions of justice, and hence each rival set 
of virtues, of each city-state (e.g. of democratic Athens, 
aristocratic Thebes, or military Sparta) could compete for 
supremacy. This, argues Macintyre, was a response o an 
incoherence attributable to the loss of an Homeric 
framework. In fact, it was this context which pitted the 
relativistic virtue conceptions of the sophists against 
the harmonious and idealist perspective of Plato. 
The synthesis between these conflicting perspectives 
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is found in the Sophoclean protagonist. In this regard, 
he stands midway between the epic hero and that of the 
modern individualist in his relationship to his community 
and his social roles. The Sophoclean protagonist "is not 
only what society takes him or her to be; he or she both 
belongs to a place in the social order and transcends it" 
(AV, p. 143). In Sophoclean tragedy, this transcendence 
of the limitations of social roles is achieved through 
moral conflict which cannot rationally be resolved. What 
was lacking was a bridge "between the acknowledgment of 
authority, of a cosmic order and of the claims to truth 
involved in the recognition of the virtues on the one hand 
and our particular perceptions and judgments in particular 
situations on the other" {AV, p. 143). But the specific 
and dramatic narrative form in which his or her life 
unfolded and the way in which conflict was handled had 
first to be known. Thus, to adopt a stance on the virtues 
is to adopt a stance on the narrative character of a human 
life. As such, 
If a human life is understood as a progress 
through harms and dangers, moral and physical, 
which someone may encounter and overcome in 
better and worse ways and with a greater or 
lesser measure of success, the virtues will find 
their place as those qualities the possession and 
exercise of which generally tend to success in 
this enterprise and the vices likewise as 
qualities which likewise tend to failure (AV, p. 
14 4) • 
Consequently, the presupposition supporting this 
Sophoclean schema rests on the belief in an objective 
68 
framework which lends truth or falsity to our judgments 
and which enjoins us to pursue certain ends. 
Two aspects of this Sophoclean schema emphasize the 
nature of its dramatic encounter. First, more than the 
fate of emotivist individuals are involved in this 
encounter in that the individual confrontations portend a 
definite outcome for the entire community whose fate hangs 
in the balance. Second, contrary to the Homeric 
framework, the "self transcends the limitations of social 
roles and is able to put those roles in question" (AV, p. 
145) while remaining accountable to the way in which the 
moral conflict was handled. 
Macintyre's protagonist in his confrontation with 
modernity is Aristotle. What he seeks to unite are 
Aristotle's perspective on the virtues with the forms of 
narrative appropriate to human life. These narratives, 
however, in addition to Macintyre's perspectives on the 
virtues, are not static; they build upon experience and 
yet are central, or should be, for our ability to reason 
morally. We can see the influenc·e of Reinhold Niebuhr on 
Macintyre in his blending of history with a perspective of 
transcendence as witnessed in his statement: 
For it is central to the conception of such a 
tradition that the past is never something merely 
to be discarded, but rather that the present is 
intelligible only as a commentary upon and 
response to the past in which the past, if 
necessary and if possible, is corrected and 
transcended, yet corrected and transcended in a 
way that leaves the present open to being in turn 
corrected and transcended by some yet more 
adequate future point of view (AV, p. 146). 
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The present, from this perspective, is not necessarily 
superior to the past. Progress, however, u~derstood as a 
flourishing of the tradition, occurs only when such a 
tradition is unified and in good order. 
Macintyre thus proceeds to resurrect Aristotle's 
teleology while altering it to become historical. He does 
this first by discarding Aristotle's metaphysical biology 
which presupposed a fixed conception of human nature. 
Secondly, he discards the location of the polis as the 
only forum of social and political forms through which the 
virtues could be cultivated for the education and moral 
development of the self. Lastly, Aristotle's moral 
psychology which viewed tragedy as resul ing only as the 
product of the protagonist's flaws rather than as a 
conflict between different conceptions of the good is 
discarded. On this last point, Macintyre replaces 
Aristotle's unity of the virtues which left no room for 
conflict or tragedy with a Sophoclean perspective which 
introduces conflict into moral discourse. This is 
necessary, for "it is through conflict and sometimes only 
through conflict that we learn what our ends and purpos s 
are" (AV, p. 164). 
What is kept of Aristotle is threefold: First, there 
is the maintenance of a cogent elaboration of the 
Aristotelian concepts of "voluntariness, the distinction 
between the intellectual virtues and the virtues of 
character, the relationship of both to natural abilities 
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and to the passions and the structure of practical 
reasoning" (AV, p. 197). Second, an Aristotelian view of 
pleasure and enjoyment are retained such that the activity 
achieved and the activity enjoyed are one and the same. 
And third, evaluation and explanation are linked, as with 
Aristotle, such that to identify certain actions as 
manifesting a virtue or failing in this regard is not only 
to evaluate actions but also to explain why certain 
actions were performed in lieu of others. Thus, human 
action is still premised upon an inclination to act formed 
by the cultivation of the virtues. And the centrality of 
the virtues is maintained in their evaluation of the good 
for mankind. 
The virtues, however, require a specific background 
in order to function properly. This background should 
consists of three features: 1) an account of a practice; 
2) an account of the narrative order of a single human 
life; and 3) an account of a moral tradition. Upon this 
background, the virtues should function as standards of 
guidance. 
Virtues will primarily be exercised in the context of 
practices though they are not limited to practices. 
Lacking the virtues, only external goods could be 
recognized with competitiveness a that society's 
exclusive feature. Thus it is only through the exercise 
of virtues that goods internal to practices can be 
recogniz d. And by a "practice," Macintyre means 
Thus 
any coherent and complex form of socially 
established cooperative human activity through 
which goods ~nternal to that form of activity are 
realized in the course of trying to achieve those 
standards of excellence which are appropriate to, 
and partially definitive of, that form of 
activity, with the result that human powers to 
achieve excellence, and human conceptions of the 
ends and goods involved, are systematically 
extended (AV, p. 187). 
bricklaying and throwing a football are 
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not 
practices, but architecture and the game of football are. 
Standards of excellence and obedience to rules are 
required. And to accept the authority of such standards 
is also to accept "the inadequacy of my own performance as 
judged by themt• (AV, p. 190). Yet practices have a 
history, and thus the standards are not immune from 
criticism. Nevertheless, "we cannot be initiated into a 
practice without accepting the authority of the best 
standards realized so far" (AV, p. 190). Only in this 
manner can we realize the difference between internal and 
external goods. The latter are mere objects of 
competition with winners and losers. Internal goods, 
however, though the outcome of competition to excel, 
portend a good "for the whole community who participates 
in the practice" (AV, pp. 190-91). Thus virtue, in this 
sense, constitutes 
an acquired human quality the possession and 
exercise of which tends to enable us to achieve 
those goods which are internal to practices and 
the lac of which effectively prevents us from 
achieving any such goods (AV, p. 191). 
In the society that pays allegiance to the virtues, 
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there will also be a telos transcending the limited goods 
of practices. Such a telos will give an order to the good 
of a whole human life conceived as a unity. This unity of 
a human life consist in the unity of a narrative quest. 
And such a quest continuously seeks to determine both what 
the good life for man is and what virtues are necessary to 
answer this question. In seeking the good, therefore, 
other goods will be ordered. In this respect, the purpose 
and content of the virtues must be understood as enabling 
us to define what is appropriate to our quest for the 
good. Macintyre states, 
The virtues therefore are to be understood as 
those dispositions which will not only sus ain 
practices and enable us to achieve the goods 
internal to practices, but which will also 
sustain us in the relevant kind of quest for the 
good, by enabling us to overcome the harms, 
dangers, temptations and distractions which we 
encounter, and which will furnish us with 
increasing self-knowledge and increasing 
knowledge of the good (AV, p. 219). 
The self conceived in the context of a narrative 
consists of two aspects. First, everyone is the subject 
of a singular unique history. Second, the narrative of 
any one life is "part of an interlocking set of 
narratives" (AV, 218). Moreover, though we live our lives 
in the context of teleology and unpredictabili y, "there 
are constraints on how the story can continue and that 
within those constraints there are indefinitely many ways 
that it can continue" (AV, p. 216). Thus, the self finds 
itself as part of a definite history in that it inherits a 
specific past, an ongoing tradition. Both the narrative 
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self and the practices it is engaged in are also part of a 
larger moral tradition which has been channeled onto the 
present. This tradition consists of an "historically 
extended, socially embodied argument, and an argument 
precisely in part about the goods which constitute that 
tradition" (AV, p. 222). And as with goods internal to 
practices and with the narrative unity of the self, what 
sustains and strengthens such a moral tradition is the 
exercise or not of the requisite virtues. 
Consequently, if the concept of a practice with goods 
internal to itself is combined with the mode of thinking 
which defines a human life as a narrative unity existing 
within the context of a much larger moral tradition, then 
we can restore "intelligibility and rationality to our 
moral and social attitudes and commitments" (AV, p. 259). 
But the goods necessary to recognize the requisite common 
grounds "can only be discovered by entering into those 
relationships which constitute communities whose central 
bond is a shared vision of and understanding of goods" 
(AV, p. 258). Only on this basis are there valid ground 
for the authority of laws and virtues. Thus, Macintyre 
concludes, "against that tradition the Nietzchean polemic 
is completely unsuccessful" (AV, p. 257). 
The reasons for Macintyre's apparent s lf-victory are 
two-fold. First, the Nietzcheans will have to rebut 
Macintyre's case for a renewed Aristotelian tradition and 
this cannot be rebutted due to the second way in which 
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Nietzche is unsuccessful. Specifically, the Nietzchean 
'great man' who, in his will to power, cannot enter into 
relationships mediated by appeal to shared standards is 
not an escape or a viable alternative to liberal 
individualist modernity. Rather, he is just "one more 
representative moment in its internal unfolding" (AV, p. 
259). He thus "represents individualism's final attempt 
to escape from its own consequences" (AV, p. 259). As 
such, the isolation and self-absorption of the Nietzchean 
'great man' which "thrust upon him the burden of being his 
own self-sufficient moral authority" (AV, p. 258) condemns 
him to a moral solipsism. 
solipsism is found only 
And the solution to this moral 
by entering into community 
relationships whose central bond is a shared vision of and 
understanding of goods. 
Macintyre's account of the virtues assumes a common 
interest which does not exist in the class-divided society 
in which we live. In criticizing Rawls and Nozick for not 
making any reference to desert in their accounts of 
justice (AV, 249), he admits that desert "is at home only 
in the context of a community whose primary bond is a 
shared understanding both of the good for man and of the 
good of that community and where individuals identify 
their primary interests with reference to those goods" 
{AV, p. 250). He does not tell us, therefore, how such a 
community of shared understandings can come about. Nore 
importantly, there is no explanation of how we can arrive 
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at a "standpoint that owes genuine allegiance to the 
tradition of the virtues" (AV, p. 255). To say that we 
need an account of a practice, an account of a narrative 
order of a single human life, and an account of a moral 
tradition is not to say just exactly how such a shared 
vision of what constitutes these concepts arises. 
Thus, the unanswered question thrust upon us is how 
are we to enter into such a community which has "a shared 
vision of and understanding of goods"? In this regard, 
Macintyre's theory is utopian, for it lacks an account of 
how to transform an emotivist society into a virtuous 
society. Ignoring material and class interests, 
Macintyre's whole analysis is aimed at proving that the 
interminable and unsettlable character of contemporary 
moral debate can only be resolved through a shared vision 
of and understanding of goods. Thus to the extent that he 
tells us what is necessary to achieve the virtuous 
society, his approach is rooted solely in the power of 
ideas. As Marx said with regard to Feuerback, "He wants 
to establish consciousness of this fact, that is to say, 
like the other theorists, he merely wants to produce a 
correct consciousness about an existing fact; whereas for 
the real Communist it is a question of overthrowing the 
existing state of things" (Marx, The German Ideology, p. 
58). He thus fails to demonstrate how the virtues can 
serve to alter ernotivist society toward a shared vision of 
and understanding of goods. 
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Secondly, Macintyre's usage of a Sophoclean dramatic 
transcendence over the limitations of social roles fails 
to recognize that even the most basic considered moral 
judgments are dependent upon one's position in the class 
structure. The dramatic narrative wherein the Sophoclean 
self is to transcend the limitations of social roles thus 
making it possible to put those roles into question will 
take contradictory forms, for Macintyre does not intend to 
do away with capitalism. In making the absurd conclusion 
that a Marxist taking to heart Trotsky's last writings 
would cease to be a Marxist, he speculates that such a 
Marxist "would now see no tolerable alternative set of 
political and economic structures which could be brought 
into place to replace the structures of advanced 
capitalism" (AV, p. 262). In making this conclusion, he 
cannot avoid the fact that the outcome of any dramatic 
conflict within capitalist society necessarily will have 
different repercussions on the proletariat than on the 
bourgeoisie. A successful defeat of striking workers may 
lead the capitalist bosses to place more stringent 
restrictions on workers' activities. Such an outcome with 
regard to members of the proletariat, however, 
them to conclude that more than temporary gains 
may lead 
must be 
fought for; indeed, the abolition of the capitalist system 
itself is required. Macintyre's perspective thus fails to 
consider that within capitalism there will be millions of 
discontented proletarians complaining that their liv s are 
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meaningless and lack any clear conception of a narrative 
unity. And unlike the bourgeoisie who as a class will 
seek to maintain this set of relations, these proletarians 
will be of a different mind about how to resolve this 
conflict and eventually will in time opt for a revolution. 
To be contented with the structures of advanced 
capitalism gives rise to a third problem. Without 
addressing the class basis of capitalist society, his 
resurrection of the telos and partially locating its 
realization in his conception of a "practice" will be 
utilized by the bourgeoisie to perpetuate their class rule 
just as the telos was used in classical Greece to justify 
slavery, the inferiority of women, a disdain for 
"barbarian" cultures, and a contempt for labour. Iabour 
discipline will thus be imposed by criticizing those who 
"step out of line" as not possessing the requisite 
virtues. Macintyre thus arbitrarily excludes those 
conceptions of the good which give preeminence to the 
Marxian virtues of community and solidarity realizable 
only by the consolidation of power by that class whose 
task it is to end all class distinctions, the modern 
proletariat. 
Fourthly, Macintyre's statement that "we need to 
attend to virtues in the first place in order to 
understand the function and authority of rules" (AV, p. 
119) signals his failure to understand that the very need 
for a theory of virtue reveals deep though ultimately 
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remediable contradictions in the relations of production. 
As such, Macintyre assumes that class divisions are an 
inevitable feature of human society. He fails to see that 
the problems of emotivism cannot be solved but only 
dissolved through the transition to a new mode of 
production which eliminates class divisions. Lacking such 
a transition, the function and authority of rules will 
depend, therefore, on that class which retains effective 
control over the means of production. 
Lastly, Macintyre's understanding of ideological 
transformation as arising solely out of moral conflict 
confirms his theory as idealistic and thus impractical. 
It is totally removed from the origin of conflict rooted 
in contradictions within the social relations of 
production 
theoretical 
and exchange. As such, 
schema can readily be used 
his three-part 
to justify the 
perpetuation of class rule, for no change in the economic 
structure is required of his theory. And by not 
perceiving social roles and conceptions of morality as the 
products of historical relations of production 
corresponding to a particular stage in the development of 
the material productive forces, his theory is thus 
ahistorical. It is ahistorical because he fails to 
demonstrate what makes a moral tradition and particular 
virtue concepts specific to different times and places. 
By the same token, his theory is non-scientific because he 
is unable to present a systematic account of the 
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transformation of morals and virtues. From Macintyre's 
perspective, moral concepts are transformed only by moral 
conflict; as a consequence, morals are self-generating. 
Thus, he ends up in the same problem of circularity of 
which he accuses emotivists. 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
Macintyre does not wish to be associated with those 
philosophers who merely reflect on the concepts of 
morality. The "Oxford armchair style" of philosophy "is 
barren" (AV 1 ix) . He contends that all such claims to 
morality must be analyzed "only within the context of a 
particular genre of historical inquiry that such arguments 
can support the type of claim about truth and rationality 
which philosophers characteristically aspire to justify" 
(AV 1 p. 265). This is so, because a "moral philosophy • 
characteristically presupposes a sociology" (AV 1 p. 
2 3) • Dissatisfied with the conception of 'moral 
philosophy' as an isolated area of inquiry, he concludes 
that "we have to learn from history and anthropology of 
the variety of moral practices, beliefs and conceptual 
schemes" (AV 1 p. ix). But as to how these "moral 
practices, beliefs and conceptual schemes" come about, 
take different forms, and transform themselves, we have 
from Macintyre only one clue. States Macintyre: 
The history of morality-and-moral-philosophy is 
the history of successive challenges to some 
preexisting moral order, a history in which the 
question of which party defeated the other in 
rational argument is always to be distinguished 
from the question of which party retained or 
gained social and political hegemony. And it is 
only by reference to this history that questions 
of rational superiority can be settled (AV, p. 
269) • -
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Rational argument is thus the key element in 
Macintyre's 11 historical" analysis. And rational 
superiority is to be distinguished from the party which 
held or usurped power. While it is true that such 
argument is specific to different historical and social 
contexts, Macintyre is most silent as to the nature of 
this historical relationship. All he will commit himself 
to is the belief that "Moral philosophies • • . always do 
articulate the morality of some particular social and 
cultural standpoint" (AV, p. 268). Early in the book, he 
denounces the modern academic practice of separating out 
the history of political and social change from the 
history of philosophy for it endows ideas "with a falsely 
independent life of their own on the one hand and 
political and social action is presented as peculiarly 
mindless on the other" (AV, p. 61). But is he not making 
this exact distinction here in reference to the rational 
superiority of moral argument? 
unite the realm of ideas with 
Further, in his claim to 
their specific social 
contexts, he focuses most exclusively on the power of 
ideas and asserts that, "Every action is the bearer and 
expression of more or less theory-laden beliefs and 
concepts; every piece of theorizing and every expression 
of belief is a political and moral action" (AV, p. 61). 
The real world is thus negated for the activity of the 
mind where thought has a life of its own. Action from 
this perspective is solely directed by self-conscious 
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thought. We explain, therefore, man's "being" by his 
"knowing." But as to the origin of this consciousness, 
these beliefs, we are only told that they are peculiar to 
specific historical contexts. But such an explanation 
presents no basis upon which these ideas are specific to 
different times and places. His "historical" argument 
thus amounts to little more than speculative theorizing in 
abstract philosophy. 
What gives ideas their unique character and 
expression and whence do they arise and why are they 
dispensed with? For Macintyre, the answer to these 
questions lies in rational argument. But argument and 
hence consciousness are products of the human mind, and 
humanity is the product of nature. Reproduction of his 
existence is the first task of man; in turn, consciousness 
develops in accordance with his interaction with nature. 
Human labour or the interaction of man with the material 
world is, therefore, necessary for cognition. The 
production relationships necessary for human life thus 
give form to the social consciousness of the members of 
any particular epoch. And such epochs are to be 
distinguished according to the historical development of 
the material productive forces and their corresponding 
production relationships and forms of exchange. As Marx 
stated, "It is not the consciousness of human beings that 
determines th ir existence, but, conversely, it is their 
social existence that determines their consciousness" 
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(Marx, "Preface to A Critique of Political Economy," p. 
389 ). Thus the social, political, and intellectual 
processes of life depend upon the particular mode of 
production of the material means of life, and it is this 
which Macintrye fails to see as the basis which grounds 
ideas to specific social contexts. 
Furthermore, it is this unity of the material base 
and the ideas which emanate therefrom which Macintyre 
writes off as an academic dualism when he criticizes 
Marxism for making a distinction between "basis and 
ideological superstructure" (AV, p. 61). He rejects the 
dialectical nature of this distinction which gives them 
their unity within a material basis. Thus, for Macintyre 
to explain moral and social conflict as the product of 
class struggles based upon economic interests is as 
foreign as heaven from earth. As Engels pointed out, the 
economic structure always furnishes the real basis for 
these class struggles. Only with this understanding can 
we "alone work out the ultimate explanation of the whole 
superstructure of juridical and political institutions as 
well as of the religious, philosophical, and other ideas 
of a given historical period" (Engels, p. 45). Only now 
could we explain man's "knowing" by his "being." 
Omitting this perspective, Macintyre thus begins his 
inquiry into emotivism as corresponding with the invention 
of the modern self. The "most articulate" of the 
philosophical spokesmen of the Enlightenment saw this 
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development as the achievement by the self of its proper 
autonomy. The self, they said, "had been liberated from 
those outmoded forms of social organization which had 
imprisoned it simultaneously within a belief in a theistic 
and teleological world order. " (AV, p. 60). But this 
separation of the self from inherited modes both of 
thought and practice in the course of a single and unified 
history required "a new social setting, but one defined by 
a variety of not always coherent beliefs and concepts" 
(AV, p. 61). What was thus invented, Macintyre insists, 
was the individual. Thought, therefore, from Macintyre's 
perspective, produces its own requirements of existence. 
A materialist perspective of the development of the 
modern self or the "free individual, .. however, produces a 
different account from that of Macintyre. Society 
beginning in the fifteenth century was engaged in the 
uprooting of feudal serfs from the countryside and 
coalescing them in cities. The new manufacturing forces 
of production required new patterns of work and new social 
relationships. This history was thus engaged in 
transforming the productive forces "from means of 
production of the individual into social means of 
production only workable by a collectivity of men" 
(Engels, p. 4 8) • The necessity to transform labour from 
its feudal relations into wage-labour is what ended these 
idyllic relations which bound man to his "natural 
superiors." Thus a transition in the material forces and 
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relations of production formed the origin of the uprooted 
self. And only from this origin and its necessary 
production relationships did subsequent reflection 
articulate the ideas which philosophically defined this 
self. The modern individual, therefore, arises as a 
theoretical expression for the justification of wage-
labour. The location of all moral particularity in the 
modern individual culminating with Nietzche is a 
subsequent development arising out of and explained by the 
social contradictions arising out of these selfsame 
relations. 
The feudal forms of social organization were 
"outmoded," but explanation for this from Macintyre is 
nonexistent. The production relations change and he takes 
this for granted without inquiring as to why this 
transformation occurs. Dismissing this question, he 
immediately moves on to an explanation of the ideological 
undertaking of the Enlightenment to determine where the 
quest 
leads 
for rational superiority broke down. His analysis 
him to conclude that the modern individual is the 
product of a breakdown in ideas, a failure of rational 
argument. Specifically, this failure is to be located in 
the project of the Enlightenment philosophers who, 
operating under the joint effect of the secular rejection 
of both Protestant and Catholic theology and the 
scientific and philosophical rejection of Aristotelianism, 
attempted nonetheless to establish a rational 
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justification for morality but failed. This failure, 
concludes Macintrye, was assured from the start. 
Eliminating any teleological notion of man-as-he-could-be-
if-he-realized-his-telos left these philosophers with only 
the remaining two elements of the teleological framework 
of a certain view of man-as-he-is and certain moral 
precepts which were to act as the bridge to enable man to 
pass from one state to the other. Thus it was impossible 
for them to come to any shared rationale for morality, 
because they all rejected any view of man as having an 
essence which defines his true end -- the telos. 
No mention is made in Macintyre's account of the 
development of trade within feudal society and 
specifically the 
operating within 
development 
the first 
of the medieval burgher 
The chartered towns. 
development of production for exchange-value as opposed to 
feudal production based upon immediate consumption or use-
value does not enter into his analysis. The emergence of 
manufacturing and the rise of a n w industrial class with 
interests contrary to those of the feudal aristocracy is 
nowhere to be found in lv1acintyre' s "historical" analysis. 
The uprooting of the serfs from the countryside and their 
linkage with the means of production through the sale of 
their labour-power to the capitalists, the 16-hour work 
days, the employment of women and children inside the 
factories for most of the working day, and the intense 
sense of alienation which resulted therefrom is absent in 
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his analytical perspective. The closest we get to these 
factors is when he laments "the relegation of art by 
modernity to the status of an essentially minority 
activity • • ." or when "work moves outside the household 
and is put to the service of impersonal capital " 
(AV, p. 227). But as to why these changes occur in the 
Enlightenment period, we find no mention. Indeed, 
Macintyre only mentions these examples to deplore the loss 
of "any narrative understanding of ourselves" (AV, p. 
227)! We are left to conclude that the transformation in 
belief systems as well as in social arrangements is 
directly related to the failure of rational argument, the 
failure of a philosophical project, as if to murmur, "If 
only those Enlightenment philosophers had not rejected 
Aristotelian teleology ..•• " 
But the existing social relations w re undergoing a 
tremendous economic and social transformation. The 
Enlightenment culture witnessed the advance of 
manufacturing and modern industry beginning with the rise 
of the feudal burgher who developed into the modern 
industrialist. Sharing his motivations and 
rooted in market capitalism with similar 
assumptions 
like-minded 
industrialists, they at once constituted a class, the 
modern bourgeoisie, opposed to the existing feudal 
relations. The death knell of feudalism was assured once 
manufacturing took root; the autopsy and explanation (i.e. 
the rational justification for the overthrow of feudal 
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relations) worked itself out following the fact. 
Thus the central argument of my thesis is a 
refutation of Macintyre ' s claim to historicism, for he 
presents no objective basis upon which to rest his claims. 
His explanation of the "Enlightenment Project" and the 
rejection of Aristotelianism fails, therefore, because it 
boils down to speculative philosophy. Lacking the 
analytical tool of class analysis rooted in a historical 
materialist perspective, there is no way to verify, test 
or confirm his speculations. He is thus left to 
conjecture that this philosophical catastrophe, which he 
alone has detected, "will have to have been of such a kind 
that it was not and has not been -- except perhaps by a 
very few -- recognized as a catastrophe" (AV, p. 3). But 
the emotivist individual which he traces back to the 
Enlightenment is no product of a philosophical 
catastrophe. Rather, an agrarian-based feudal economy was 
supplanted by a manufacturing-based capitalist economy and 
the changed relations of production produced the 
conditions in which the ernotivist individual developed. 
His development, therefore, is not a philosophical 
abstraction but rather the consequence of the conditions 
of wage-labour. The "free individual" was thus left to 
fend for himself, and this struggle pitted the owners of 
the means of production against those who only had their 
labour-power to sell. The struggle between classes on the 
social level is therefore expressed at the theoretical 
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level in the form of emotivism. As a consequence, 
Macintyre's resurrection of Aristotelian teleology as the 
solution to emotivism fails, for a shared rationale and 
understanding of goods cannot flourish in the class-
structured relations of capitalism. Unable to see any 
alternative set of political and economic structures to 
advanced capitalism, his theory, therefore, has no more 
rational claim to objective criteria than the pluralistic 
society which Macintyre condemns. 
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NOTES 
1. In his Theory of Moral Sentiments, Smith presents us 
with an explanation of sympathy as arising out of a 
transference of the misery or suffering of others onto 
ourselves which thus allows us to come to some conception 
of what the other feels. States Smith: 
As we have no immediate experience of what other 
men feel, we can form no idea of the manner in 
which they are affected, but by conceiving what 
we ourselves should feel in the like situation. 
Though our brother is upon the rack, as long as 
we ourselves are at our ease, our senses will 
never inform us of what he suffers. They never 
did, and never can, carry us beyond our own 
person, and it is by the imagination only that we 
can form any conception of what are his 
sensations. Neither can that faculty help us to 
this any other way, than by representing to us 
what would be our own, if we were in his case. 
It is the impressions of our own senses only, not 
those of his, which our imaginations copy. By 
the imagination we place ourselves in his 
situation, we conceive ourselves enduring all the 
same torments, we enter as it were into his body, 
and become in some measure the same person with 
him, and thence form some idea of his sensations, 
and even feel something which, though weaker in 
degree, is not altogether unlike them. His 
agonies, when they are thus brought home to 
ourselves, when we have thus adopted and made 
them our own, begin at last to affect us, and we 
then tremble and shudder at the thought of what 
he feels. For as to be in pain or distress of 
any kind excites the most excessive sorrow, so to 
conceive or to imagine that we are in it, excites 
some degree of the same emotion, in proportion to 
the vivacity or dulness of the conception (Smith, 
pp. 3-4). 
Pain and sorrow are not the only passions which give rise 
to sympathy, however; included also is "every passion of 
which the mind of man is susceptible" (Smith, p. 5). 
2. One vivid reference first published in 1853 on these 
codes is The American Slave Code by William Goodell. An 
opening letter to the author from the Hon. William Jay 
concerning the manuscript reads in part, 
You show us the rack constructed "according to 
law;" we examine, at our leisure, the cruel but 
skilful contrivance of its machinery; We see the 
ministers of the law bind the victim on the 
instrument of torture; we see one feature of 
humanity after another crushed and obliterated, 
till at last an immortal man, made a little lower 
than the angels, and for whose redemption the Son 
of God shed his blood on the cross, is converted 
into a beast of burden -- a vendible animal, 
scourged at the will of its owner, and offered 
for sale in the market with horses and oxen 
{Goodell, pp. 11-12). 
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3. Bhaskar describes the threefold nature of Marx's 
materialism as derived from the Theses on Feuerbach where 
'matter' is to be understood in the sense of 'social 
practice' as follows: 1) objectivity or externality as 
such; 2) objectification as the production of a subject; 
and 3) objectification as the process of the reproduction 
or transformation of social forms. With regard to the 
second aspect or human intentions, it must be understood 
in conjunction with transformative activity as two aspects 
of a unity (Bottomore, et al., p. 325). 
4. Macintyre speaks of the achievements of the Scottish 
Enlightenment in particular as overshadowing that of the 
English and most especially the French. But in so arguing, 
he implies that the secularized Northern European culture 
was primarily interested in formulating a justification of 
moral belief. The work of Ronald Meek on the contrary 
suggests that the major writings of most of these same 
scholars Macintyre mentions was in the areas of sociology 
and economics which he details in "The Scottish 
Contribution to Marxist Sociology" by demonstrating how 
four prominent members of the Scottish Historical School, 
Adam Smith, Adam Ferguson, William Robertson, and John 
Millar developed Classical sociology, out of which 
developed the Classical political economy of David Ricardo 
and Adam Smith, "to a stage where it was becoming 
remarkably similar, at least in its broad outlines, to 
Marxist sociology" (Meek, p. 35). 
5. Absolute surplus-value is produced by lengthening of 
the working day. Relative surplus-value arises from the 
curtailment of the necessary labour-time (i.e. the labour-
time necessary for the worker's own preservation or 
continued reproduction as a worker) , and from the 
corresponding alteration in the respective lengths of the 
two components of the working day: a) the rate of 
surplus-value, and b) the length of the working day (Marx, 
Capital, ~ f, Ch. 12, pp. 429-438). 
6. Craft guilds, made up of exclusive and privileged 
groups of artisans were, during the feudal period, granted 
monopoly rights to markets by the municipal authorities. 
92 
The guilds imposed minute regulations on their members 
controlling such matters as working hours, wages prices 
tools, and the hiring of workers (taken from the 1 Notes i~ 
the Communist Manifesto, p. 46). 
7. Marx states: "We must never forget that even the serf 
was not only the owner of the piece of la~d attached to 
his house, although admittedly he was mer~ly a tribute-
paying owner, but also a co-proprietor of the common land" 
(Marx, Capital, V. !r p. 877). 
8. Traditional elements which have supported 
capitalism since the end of World War II ar~ seen by 
analysts to be in advanced states of decay 
disintegration (cf. Mandel, 1976; Har~ington, 
Greenberg, 1979). As Greenberg states: 
American hegemony in the world capitalist system 
is giving way to the reappearance Of intense 
intercapitalist rivalry and the revolt of 
important sections of the Third World. The 
domestic economic engine of American prosperity 
is beginning to sputter under the pressures of 
inescapable problems like endemic inflation, 
unemployment, fiscal crisis, and multiple 
externalities. Finally, the managerial tools of 
the state are not only becoming less able to 
manage system contradictions, but are themselves 
now beginning, in many respects, to both 
exacerbate ongoing contradictions and create new 
and dangerous ones (Greenberg, pp. 160-61). 
u.s. 
many 
and 
1976; 
9. The Bill of Rights itself has roots in the struggles 
of farmers in the early days of the Republic, most 
especially the conflict associated with Shay's Rebellion 
in western Massachusetts. 
10. One percent of the population owns approximately 
twenty-five percent of the entire population's net worth, 
and one-half of one percent owns twenty percent. To 
comprehend this concentration of wealth, Simon and Eitzen 
ask us to consider that: 
only 55,400 adults have one million dollars or 
more in corporate stock; only 73,500 adults have 
200,000 dollars or more in bonds and debt 
holdings; one-twentieth of one percent of adults 
own twenty percent of all corporate stock, two-
thirds of the worth of all state and local bonds, 
and two-fifths of all bonds and notes; and the 
richest one percent own one-seventh of all real 
estate and one-seventh of all cash (Simon & 
Eitzen, p. 7) . 
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11. The Vietnam War was a significant turning point for 
such revelations as indicated by Simon and Eitzen. They 
write: 
The Pentagon Papers, investigative reporting, and 
leaks from within the government had the effect 
of turning public opinion against the war and the 
government. Revealed were a number of 
governmental transgressions, including the 
manipulation of Congress by President Johnson 
with the Gulf of Tonkin incident; the indictment 
of high-ranking officers for war crimes similar 
to those committed by the Germans and Japanese 
during World War II; the deliberate destruction 
of civilian targets by American forces; 
intelligence agency suppression of information 
regarding enemy troop strength and sympathizers 
in South Vietnam; falsified reports by American 
field commanders regarding the destruction of 
enemy targets; the spraying of more than five 
million acres of South Vietnam with defoliating 
chemicals; the execution of more than 40,000 so-
called enemy agents by the CIA under the Phoenix 
Program (most without trial); and unauthorized 
bombing raids against North Vietnam. From early 
1969 until May, 1970, President Nixon assured the 
American people that the neutrality of Cambodia 
was being respected. Yet, Nixon had secretly 
ordered the bombing of so-called enemy 
sanctuaries in that country during that period. 
He was able to keep the bombings secret through 
the use of a double-entry bookkeeping system 
arranged between the White House and the Defense 
Department (Simon & Eitzen, p. 2). 
More recently, the Iran-Contra affair has produced 
numerous disclosures of illegal and covert operations 
designed to overthrow a popularly-constituted government 
in Nicaragua. Current revelations show high-level 
involvement in blatantly illegal activities including 
lying to Congress, gun running in violation of an 
expressed prohibition by law, bombing of harbors, murder, 
and other terroristic activities and violations of 
international law. 
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